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Preface
This thesis consists of three chapters, which can be read independently. The chapters
investigate how prices are set in the secondary market for corporate loans, corporate
bonds, and credit default swaps (CDS).
The first chapter investigates how managers of collateralized loan obligations (CLO)
trade in the leveraged loan market. Some CLO managers face search or information
frictions implying that they trade loans at less favorable prices than other CLO man-
agers. The managers who obtain the most favorable prices are those that are most
actively trading in the leveraged loan market. We show that, the more active the CLO
manager is, the better the CLO performs.
The second chapter addresses differences between bank loans issued when the bank
and the borrower had a close relationship (relationship loans) and bank loans issued
when the bank and the borrower had no relationship (non-relationship loans). I show
that relationship loans outperform non-relationship loans in the sense that relationship
loans are more likely to get upgraded and trade at higher prices in the secondary
market. This is after controlling for the publics perception of the borrowers credit
risk at the time of loan issuance. This finding suggests that relationship banks are in
possession of proprietary information about the borrower.
The third and final chapter examines how information flows between the CDS and
the corporate bond market. The focus of the paper is the methodologies used to quan-
tify how such information flows, i.e., Granger causality, the Hasbrouck measure, and
the Gonzalo Granger measure. We show that the presence of market microstructural
frictions, e.g., illiquidity, bias the tests in favor of showing that information flows from
the market without microstructural noise to the market with microstructural noise,
even though both markets absorb new information simultaneously.
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Introduction and Summaries
Classical asset pricing theory assumes “perfect markets” which means that financial
markets are frictionless. However, in the real world financial frictions exists. Recently
the financial literature has focused more on these frictions and on how they affect asset
prices. This thesis contributes to the literature by providing evidence on how financial
frictions affect pricing and trading of corporate loans.
The first chapter examines how managers of collateralized loan obligations (CLOs)
trade leveraged loans and how their activity affects the performance of the CLO.
The second chapter examines how the performance of leveraged loans depends on the
borrowers’ relationship with its bank. The third chapter studies methodologies used
to quantify how information flows between the corporate bond and the credit default
swap market.
1 Summaries in English
Active Loan Trading
The first chapter studies the activity of managers of collateral loan obligations (CLOs).
CLOs are structured finance products where a portfolio of high yield corporate loans
(leveraged loans) are pooled and formed into tranches with different seniorities. The
CLO manager is in charge of selecting the initial loan portfolio and actively rebalancing
the collateral pool by selling and purchasing loans. That the manager actively manages
the portfolio after issuance is a special feature, distinguishing CLOs from most other
asset-backed securities. We define active loan trades as transactions a CLO manager
executes to rebalance the collateral portfolio, to enhance the CLO’s performance. The
counterfactual is non-active trades, which the CLO manager executed to comply with
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pre-specified restrictions. In the chapter, we answer two questions: (1) Is active trading
benefitting the CLO investors? (2) What distinguish CLO managers who are active
from CLO managers who are not so active?
We start by distinguishing active loan trades from non-active trades and find that
active loan trades are conducted at better prices than non-active trades. The effect is
much larger for sales than purchases, which is intuitive as the primary market for lever-
aged loans, where mosts loan purchases take place, is much bigger than the secondary
market, where loan sales take place. The opaque and less liquid secondary market is
naturally a market where a more skilled investor can employ his or hers comparative
advantage. Investigating loan sales further we find that active sales predict rating
downgrades, suggesting that CLO managers sell loans before they are downgraded.
Motivated by this finding, we investigate if CLOs with different levels of active
turnover, measured as the ratio between active sales and CLO size, execute loan trans-
actions at different prices and find that CLOs with a higher active turnover trade loans
at better prices than less active CLOs. In addition, active CLOs sell leveraged loans
earlier than less active CLOs and before rating downgrades. Turning to the implica-
tions of more active turnover for CLO performance, more active trading increases the
returns to equity investors and, at the same time, lowers the default rate of the CLO’s
collateral portfolio. By contrast, using a placebo variable that captures non-active
turnover (the ratio between non-active sales and CLO size), we find that non-active
turnover predicts higher CLO collateral default rates.
Relationship Lending and Loan Performance on the Secondary Market
In this chapter, I examine the benefits of relationship lending, i.e. when a bank con-
tinues to lend to the same borrower. I distinguish myself from the existing literature
by examining how, so called, relationship loans perform on the secondary market. For
this purpose, I employ the same dataset as is used in chapter 1. The data provides
transaction prices and credit ratings of leveraged loans, which are bank loans extended
to below investment grade rated corporations. When a bank lends money to a firm,
the bank typically starts a strict monitoring process. The monitoring process implies
that the bank collects proprietary information which is not known to the public. The
viii
information gathering is put in place in order for the bank to decide whether to grant a
loan and if so, to decide the appropriate terms for the loan. The objective of this paper
is to document that relationship loans outperform relative to market expectations at
loan issuance, and thereby document that banks learn the true credit quality of the
firm through repeated lending.
I measure post issuance loan performance on two dimensions: credit ratings and
transactions prices. First, I show that relationship loans are more likely to be upgraded
and to some extent less likely to be downgraded. That is, the relationship bank is able
to pick borrowers who outperform relative to other firms that, at the time of loan
issuance, are viewed equally risky by the market. The only way banks can select these
borrowers, who later outperform, is by having proprietary information allowing them
to observe the borrowers’ true credit quality. Secondly, I show that transactions prices
are higher for relationship loans than non-relationship loans, after controlling for the
public’s view of the borrowers’ credit quality at loan issuance. This result is consistent
with relationship loans more frequently being upgraded. Furthermore, it shows that
investors who trade relationship loans can earn higher returns than investors who are
trading non-relationship loans. Finally, I examine the volatility of transaction prices
and find that relationship loan prices are less volatility which benefits the investor as
well.
Revisiting the Lead-Lag Relationship Between Corporate Bonds and Credit
Default Swaps
The third chapter studies methodologies used to quantify which financial market is
first to incorporate new information of the underlying risk, the so-called lead-lag rela-
tionship between the two markets. The study is done on the CDS and the corporate
bond market, but the methodologies apply to any two markets that share an underly-
ing risk. In a simulation study, we show that prevailing lead-lag tests in the literature,
i.e. Granger causality, the Hasbrouck measure, and the Gonzalo Granger measure,
are biased if asset prices include a microstructural noise component, in the form of a
bid-ask spread or a time-varying liquidity component. The microstructural noise com-
ponent creates negative autocorrelation in price increments which biases the tests in
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favor of finding that information flows from the market without microstructural noise
to the market with microstructural noise.
We compute autocorrelations of the data and find no signs of consistent non-zero
autocorrelation in CDS spread increments, but a strong tendency towards negative au-
tocorrelation in corporate bond spread increments derived from both end-of-day trans-
action prices and daily bid quotes. This raises the question of whether earlier papers,
that test the lead-lag relationship between CDS and corporate bonds using Granger
causality, Hasbrouck or Gonzalo Granger, are biased. We then test the lead-lag rela-
tionship between CDS and corporate bonds and find that price discovery increases in
the corporate bond market when we use a method that is not prone to this bias.
The first part of the analysis is done using corporate bond quotes. Utilizing in-
formation from public end-of-day transactions of corporate bonds, we find that price
discovery in the corporate bond market increases. Furthermore, we document the im-
portance of controlling execution time of transactions, by showing that price discovery
in the corporate bond market increases further if we only consider transactions that
are executed after 3 pm. Finally, to reject the notion that the last result is driven by a
subsample selection, we look at the interaction between relative liquidity in the CDS
and the corporate bond market and the relative contribution to price discovery. We
find that high CDS liquidity improves the relative contribution to price discovery from
the CDS market, but no clear evidence of such a link in the corporate bond market.
x
2 Summaries in Danish
Active Loan Trading
Det første kapitel undersøger hvor aktivet managere af collateralized loan obligation
(CLO’er) agerer i markedet. CLO’er er strukturerede finansielle produkter, hvor en
portefølje af gearede l˚an samles og formes i trancher med forskellige anciennitet. CLO-
manageren har ansvaret for at vælge den initiale l˚aneportepølje og aktivt at rebalancere
porteføljen ved at sælge og købe l˚an efter CLO’ens ustedelse. Det at CLO-manageren
aktivt forvalter porteføljen efter udstedelses datoen er en speciel karakteristika ved
CLO’er og noget som managere af de fleste andre typer af asset-backed securities
ikke gør. Vi definerer aktive handler som transaktioner udført af CLO-manageren for
at optimere l˚an-porteføljen og derved at forbedre CLO’ens afkast. Det modsatte af
aktive handler er ikke-aktive handler, som CLO-manageren udfører for at overholde
forudbestemte krav til porteføljens sammensætning. Vi besvarer 2 spørgsm˚al i kapitlet:
(1) Gavner aktive handler CLO-investorerne? (2) Hvad adskiller CLO-managere, der
er aktive fra CLO-managere, der er mindre aktive?
Vi starter med at skelne mellem aktive handler og ikke-aktive handler og finder at
aktive handler udføres til bedre priser end ikke-aktive handler. Effekten er væsenligt
større for salg end køb, hvilket intuitivt giver mening, da det primære marked for
gearede l˚an, hvor de fleste køb finder sted, er langt større end det sekundære marked for
gearede l˚an, hvor salg finder sted. Det uigennemsigtige og mindre likvide sekundære
marked er naturligt et marked, hvor den talentfulde investor bedre kan udnytte sin
komparative fordel. Desmere finder vi at aktive salg forudsiger nedjusteringer af l˚anets
kredritværdighed, hvilket tyder p˚a, at CLO-manageren sælger l˚an, umiddelbart før
deres kredritværdighed nedjusteres.
Motiveret af disse resultater undersøger vi, om CLO’er som er mere eller mindre
aktive, m˚alt ved forholdet mellem CLO’ens samlede omsætning fra aktive salg og
CLO’ens størrelse, sælger l˚an til forskellige priser. Vi finder at CLO’er, som er mere
aktive, handler l˚an til bedre priser end mindre aktive CLO. Derudover sælger aktive
CLO’er l˚anene tidligere end mindre aktive CLO’er, og før at l˚anenes kreditvurdering
bliver nedjusteret. Til sidst finder vi, at en øget aktivitet hos CLO manageren ogs˚a har
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betydning for CLO investorerne i form af højere afkast til egenkapitalinvestorer og
lavere konkursrater i l˚anporteføljen. Tests med en placebo-variable, der m˚aler forholdet
mellem omsætningen ved ikke-aktivt salg og CLO’ens størrelse, viser at en større andel
ikke-aktive handler forudsiger højere konkursrater i l˚anporteføljen.
Relationship Lending and Loan Performance on the Secondary Market
I dette kapitel undersøger jeg fordelene ved “relationship-l˚an”, dvs. l˚an der er udstedt
af en bank til en virksomhed, som banken kender godt igennem gentagen l˚angivning.
Jeg bidrager til den eksisterende litteratur ved at undersøge, hvordan disse “relationship-
l˚an” handler p˚adet sekundære marked. Til dette form˚al anvender jeg det samme
datasæt, som der er anvendt i kapitel 1. Datasættet indeholder transaktionspriser og
kreditvurderinger af gearede l˚an, som er bankl˚an udstedt til virksomheder med la-
vere kreditvurdering. N˚ar en bank udl˚aner penge til en virksomhed, vil banken typisk
starte en vurderingsproces af virksomheden. Processen indebærer, at banken indsam-
ler information om virksomheden, som ikke er kendt for offentligheden. Form˚alet med
indsamlingen af information er at gøre det muligt for banken at vurdere om den skal
yde et l˚an til virksomheden, og i s˚atilfælde, at beslutte hvilke vilk˚ar l˚anet skal udstedes
til. Ma˚let med dette papir er at dokumentere, at “relationship-l˚an” klare sig bedre end
hvad markedsforventningerne var ved udstedelse af l˚anet, og derved at dokumenterer
at banker lærer virksomhedens sande kreditkvalitet gennem det tætte forhold de har
til kunden.
Jeg m˚aler hvordan l˚anet klarer sig p˚a to parametre: l˚anets kreditvurdering og
transaktionspriser. Først viser jeg, at “relationship-l˚an” er mere tilbøjelige til at
f˚a deres kreditvurdering opjusteret og til en vis grad mindre tilbøjelige til at f˚a deres
kreditvurdering nedjusteret. Det vil sige, at banken er i stand til at vælge at l˚ane til
virksomheder, der klarer sig bedre end andre virksomheder, som markedet vurderer lige
risikable p˚a tidspunktet for udstedelsen af l˚anene. Den eneste m˚ade hvorp˚a banken
kan vælge disse fordelagtige l˚antagere p˚a, er ved at have kendskab til information
vedrørende l˚antagernes sande kreditkvalitet, som markedet, ved l˚anet udstedelse, endnu
ikke er opmærksom p˚a. Ydermere viser jeg, at transaktionspriserne er højere for
“relationship-l˚an” end andre l˚an, efter at jeg har kontrolleret for offentlighedens op-
xii
fattelse af l˚antagernes kreditkvalitet i udstedelsestidspunktet. Dette resultat er i ov-
erensstemmelse med det tidligere resultat – at “relationship-l˚anenes” kreditvurdering
oftere bliver opjusteret. Desuden viser dette resultat, at investorer, der handler med
“relationship-l˚an”, kan opn˚a højere afkast end investorer, der handler andre l˚an. En-
deligt undersøger jeg volatiliteten i transaktionspriser og finder at transaktionspriser
p˚a“relationship-l˚an” er mindre volatile, hvilket tillige er en fordel for investorerne.
Revisiting the Lead-Lag Relationship Between Corporate Bonds and Credit
Default Swaps
Det tredje kapitel studerer metoder, der bruges til at kvantificere hvilket af to finan-
sielle markeder, der først inkorporerer nye oplysninger om den underliggende risiko
i prisen, det s˚akaldte lead-lag-forhold mellem de to markeder. Kapitlet undersøger
specifikt CDS- og erhvervsobligations-markedet, men metoderne, der omtales, gælder
for to vilk˚arlige markeder, s˚a længe de er drevet af samme underliggende risiko. Vi
viser i et simuleringsstudie, at de gængse lead-lag test i litteraturen, dvs. Granger
kausalitet, Hasbrouck m˚alet, og Gonzalo Granger m˚alet, kan producere skævvredet re-
sultater hvis priserne i et af markederne inkluderer et mikrostrukturelt støj-led, i form
af et bid-ask spænd eller en tidsvarierende likviditet. Den mikrostrukturelle støj ska-
ber negativ autokorrelation i daglige prisændringer, som skævvrider konklusionen af
testene. Skævvridningen fungerer s˚aledes at man vil konkludere at ny information først
inkorporeres i markedet uden mikrostrukturel støj, for derefter at blive inkorporeret i
markedet med mikrostrukturel støj. P˚a trods af at begge markeder – i virkeligheden –
er lige hurtige til at inkorporere ny information.
Vi beregner autokorrelationer i data og finder ingen tegn p˚a at autokorrelationen
i daglig ændringer i CDS-spændet er forskellig fra nul. Til gengæld finder vi en stærk
tendens til negativ autokorrelation i daglige prisændringer i erhvervsobligationer. Det
gælder b˚ade n˚ar vi hente obligationspriser fra daglige transaktionspriser eller fra daglige
dealer bid-quotes. Dette rejser spørgsm˚alet, om hvorvidt resultaterne fra tidligere
studier, der tester lead-lag forholdet mellem CDS og erhvervsobligationer ved brugen af
Granger kausalitet, Hasbrouck eller Gonzalo Granger, er skævvredet. Vi tester derefter
lead-lag forholdet mellem CDS og erhvervsobligationerne og finder at inkorporationen
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af ny information i erhvervsobligationer i større grad sker tidligere end i CDS markedet,
n˚ar vi bruger en metode, som ikke er udsat for denne skævvridning.
Den første del af analysen er lavet ved brug af bid-quotes p˚a erhvervsobligationerne.
Udnytter vi oplysninger fra offentlige handlestransaktioner af erhvervsobligationerne,
finder vi, at inkorporationen af ny information i obligationsmarkedet sker tidligere.
Desuden dokumenterer vi vigtigheden af at tage højde for tidspunktet transaktioner
er gennemført p˚a, ved at vise at inkorporationen af ny information i erhvervsobliga-
tionsmarkedet stiger yderligere, hvis vi kun betragte transaktioner, der udføres efter
kl 15:00. For at afkræfte at det sidste resultat opst˚ar fordi vi sidder tilbage med de
mest likvide obligationer, ser vi til sidst p˚a sammenhængen mellem den relative lik-
viditet i CDS- og erhvervsobligationsmarkedet og de to markeders indbyrdes lead-lag
forhold. Vi finder at højere CDS-likviditet betyder tidligere inkorporering af ny in-
formation i CDS-markedet, men ingen tydelige tegn p˚a at det samme er tilfældet for
erhvervsobligationsmarkedet.
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Chapter 1
Active Loan Trading
with Frank Fabozzi, Sven Klingler, and Mads Stenbo Nielsen
Abstract:
Analyzing a novel dataset of leveraged loan trades executed by managers of collater-
alized loan obligations (CLOs), we document the importance of “active loan trades” –
trades executed at a manager’s discretion. Active loan sales are conducted at better
prices than non-active sales and before rating downgrades. More active CLOs trade
at better prices than less active CLOs, selling leveraged loans earlier and before they
get downgraded. More active trading also increases the returns to equity investors
and lowers collateral portfolio default rates. In contrast, tests with a placebo variable,
capturing passive turnover, lead to insignificant results.
We are grateful to Niels Friewald (discussant), David Lando, conference participants at the 2017
NFN PhD workshop, seminar participants at BI Norwegian Business School, Copenhagen Business
School, Tilburg University, and WU Vienna for helpful comments. Klingler, Mølgaard, and Nielsen
gratefully acknowledge support from the FRIC Center for Financial Frictions (grant no. DNRF102).
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1 Introduction
Leveraged loans – loans in which a lead bank arranges a syndicate of lenders – are a
primary source of financing for low-rated corporations. These loans are traded over the
counter (OTC) and in contrast to other OTC transactions, there is no systematic post-
trade reporting for leveraged loan transactions. In this paper, we investigate trading
patterns in this market by utilizing a novel dataset of transaction prices reported by
collateralized loan obligations (CLOs). CLOs are structured finance products with
an actively managed collateral pool comprised of leveraged loans and are one of the
largest leveraged loan investors. Besides purchasing new loans from arranging banks,
the CLO collateral manager can enhance the CLO performance by trading parts of
the existing loan portfolio on the secondary market. This active loan trading by CLO
managers is the focus of our paper.
We define active loan trading as transactions a CLO manager executes to rebalance
the collateral portfolio. Distinguishing active loan sales from other sales (henceforth
non-active sales), we find that active loan sales are conducted at better prices than
non-active sales. Furthermore, active sales predict rating downgrades. Motivated by
this finding, we investigate if CLOs with different levels of active turnover, measured
as the ratio between active sales and CLO size, execute loan transactions at different
prices and find that CLOs with a higher active turnover trade loans at better prices
than less active CLOs. In addition, active CLOs sell leveraged loans earlier than
less active CLOs and before rating downgrades. Turning to the implications of more
active turnover for CLO performance, more active trading increases the returns to
equity investors and, at the same time, lowers the default rate of the CLO’s collateral
portfolio. By contrast, using a placebo variable that captures non-active turnover (the
ratio between non-active sales and CLO size), we find that non-active turnover predicts
higher CLO collateral default rates.
The leveraged loan trading of CLOs provides an interesting laboratory for studying
the impact of active portfolio management on loan transaction prices and manage-
rial performance. In contrast to other active portfolio managers, CLOs face complex
portfolio constraints which can prevent less skilled managers from portfolio rebalanc-
ing. Contractually imposed performance-based tests for the collateral enforce a spe-
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cific structure on the collateral portfolio, thereby limiting the risk-taking capability of
CLOs. In rebalancing the collateral portfolio, a CLO needs to comply with these tests
– it needs to find a potential buyer for part of the loan portfolio and find new loans
that ensure compliance with the collateral tests. Given these challenges for portfolio
rebalancing, we hypothesize that more of this active trading indicates good collateral
management.
As a starting point of our analysis, after splitting the sample of loan trades into
active sales and non-active sales, we find that active sales are conducted at better prices
than non-active sales. Moreover, active sales predict rating downgrades. Next, we
investigate the drivers of active turnover and find that CLO-specific characteristics (e.g.
CLO age and size) have more explanatory power for active turnover than collateral
portfolio characteristics (e.g. diversification and average time to maturity), refuting
a mechanical link between active turnover and the liquidity of the CLO collateral
portfolio.
Given the higher transaction prices for active sales and their predictive power for
rating downgrades, we next investigate if more active and less active CLOs differ in
their trading patterns. To that end, we split the sample of CLOs into three portfolios,
based on their quarterly active turnover, and rebalance the portfolios every quarter.
Comparing the average transaction prices of the most active and least active CLOs,
we find that more active CLOs, earn 5.47 dollars (on an average transaction of 88.60
dollars) more than less active CLOs when they sell loans. In addition, more active
CLOs purchase cheaper loans than less active CLOs, but the average difference of
37 cents (on a 96.93 dollar transaction) is small compared to the difference in sale
prices. We next compare active and less active CLO managers’ transaction prices of
the same loan, for trades executed within the same month. Studying these matched
transactions, we find that high turnover CLOs earn 9 cents (on a 94 dollar transaction)
more when selling the same loan in the same month as low turnover CLOs, and pay
5 cents less (on a 98 dollar transaction) when purchasing the same loan at the same
time. Despite the lower economic magnitude, both price differences are statistically
significant at a 1% level. In line with our intuition that finding a potential loan buyer
is more difficult than simply purchasing a loan on the primary market (where price
differences across loan buyers are smaller), the difference in sale prices is considerably
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larger than the difference in purchase prices for both tests. Hence, we focus our next
tests on loan sales.
If we refrain from matching on transaction time in the matched sample we find that
active CLOs earn 95 cent (on a 95 dollar transaction) more than less active CLOs. This
difference in earnings is more than 10 times larger than the difference in earnings we
find in the loan and time matched sample. Hence, we next investigate if more active
CLOs are better capable of timing the leveraged loan market by selling non-performing
loans earlier. To that end, we compare transaction prices of the same loan without
controlling for the timing of the transaction and find that high turnover CLOs earn
95 cents more (on a 94.59 dollar transaction) when they sell the same loan as a low
turnover CLO. Investigating our timing hypothesis, we find that high turnover CLOs
sell 111 days earlier than low turnover CLOs. In addition, when high turnover CLOs
sell a loan, the loan rating is significantly higher than when low turnover CLOs sell the
same loan, suggesting that more active CLOs are better at anticipating deteriorating
loan conditions.
Motivated by the large differences in transaction prices between active and less
active CLOs, we next investigate if more active trading impacts the overall CLO per-
formance. To that end, we compare the performance of the most active and least active
CLOs, where we form portfolios using information from the previous quarter. We find
that more active CLOs generate higher returns to their equity investors and have lower
collateral default rates. Most noticeably, the percentage of defaulted loans is over 50%
higher for the least active CLOs, compared to the most active CLOs, suggesting that
the most active CLOs are better capable of avoiding defaults in their loan portfolios.
As a placebo test, we also sort CLOs into portfolios based on their non-active turnover,
measured as sales without matching purchases within a 7-day time window, and find
no significant difference in equity returns but a significantly higher default rate for
CLOs with more passive turnover.
To conclude our investigation of the CLO managers’ performance, we check if CLO
investors could utilize our active turnover measure to guide their investment choices.
We compute the average active turnover of each CLO in the first observed year and
split the CLO sample into three portfolios, based on first-year active turnover. Similar
to the previous portfolio splits, we find that more active CLO managers outperform
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less active managers. Most notably, using a subset of closed CLOs for which we observe
all available cash flows, we compute the internal rate of return (IRR) and find that
CLOs with a high initial active turnover have an IRR of 14% compared to an IRR of
2% for the less active CLOs.
The drawback of comparing portfolios of CLOs with different levels of active
turnover is that it does not allow us to control for other effects. Hence, as a ro-
bustness test, we run panel regressions of transaction prices and CLO performance on
active turnover. We find that, even after controlling for transaction size, loan time to
maturity and rating, as well as various CLO and collateral portfolio characteristics,
CLOs with higher active turnover sell leveraged loans at higher prices than CLOs with
a lower active turnover. Similarly, CLOs with a higher active turnover in the previ-
ous quarter have higher equity payments and lower collateral default rates, even after
controlling for CLO and collateral portfolio characteristics.
Related Literature
We study the link between active portfolio management by CLOs and the quality of
their leveraged loan transactions. In that our research relates to the literature on CLOs
and structured finance, the literature on leveraged loans and trading in OTC markets,
and the literature on active portfolio management. Structured finance issuance data
from Bank of America illustrate the growing importance of CLOs: Between 2006 and
2016 there was an increase in both the absolute CLO issuance (from $64 billion to $83
billion) and the share of CLOs in the overall structured finance issuance (from 26% to
98%). Given this recent surge in popularity, investigating CLOs and their active port-
folio management is crucial. Benmelech and Dlugosz (2009) give a detailed overview
of rating practices in the CLO market and find that most CLOs have a similar “boiler-
plate” structure. More recently, Liebscher and Ma¨hlmann (2016) find that the best
CLO managers (measured by their past returns) keep outperforming their peers despite
of new capital inflows. This finding contradicts the cash flow performance relationship
documented for mutual funds by Chevalier and Ellison (1997) and challenge the theory
by Berk and Green (2004) on active management. Our finding that CLOs with more
active trading get better transaction prices explains why an increase in assets under
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management does not weaken future CLO performance.
The CLO collateral portfolio comprises leveraged loans, which are syndicated loans
to credit-risky corporations. Unlike stocks, these loans trade in an opaque OTC market
where it is crucial to pick the right loans. Benmelech, Dlugosz, and Ivashina (2012)
and Bord and Santos (2015) debate whether CLOs differ from other securitizations
in the sense that there is no adverse loan selection problem for CLOs. The effects of
securitization on leveraged loan prices are studied by, among others, Ivashina and Sun
(2011), Nadauld and Weisbach (2012), and Shivdasani and Wang (2011). Ivashina
and Sun (2011) show that institutional demand for buying leveraged loans by CLOs
can decrease loan prices. Nadauld and Weisbach (2012) and Shivdasani and Wang
(2011) study the influence of securitization on corporate debt and leveraged buyouts,
respectively. Loan sales have been studied by Gatev and Strahan (2009) who find that
banks are a primary investor in illiquid loans and by Drucker and Puri (2009) who study
the link between loans’ characteristics and their propensity to be sold. We contribute
to this literature by investigating trade-level data of leveraged loan transaction on the
secondary market.
Our findings suggest an inefficiency in the leveraged loan market that enables
more active CLOs to outperform less active CLOs by selling deteriorating loans early.
Thereby, we contribute to the current debate on whether active portfolio management
can improve the investor returns. For example, Pastor, Stambaugh, and Taylor (2017)
find that more active mutual fund managers outperform less active managers. We
find a similar result for CLOs, where more active CLOs have higher equity returns
and lower collateral default rates. In addition, Busse, Tong, Tong, and Zhang (2016)
find a positive relationship between trading frequency and portfolio returns for institu-
tional equity investors. Our findings add to this literature by showing that the effects
of more active management are even more pronounced in the leveraged loan market.
To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first one to investigate leveraged loan
transactions executed by CLOs.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We provide a brief description
of CLOs in Section 2 and describe our dataset and variable construction in Section
3. Section 4 provides motivating evidence for investigating active loan turnover. We
present our main analysis as well as additional regression analysis in Sections 5 and 6,
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respectively. Section 7 concludes.
2 CLOs and Leveraged Loans
We now summarize the relevant CLO features for our analysis, focusing on the CLO
manager and the underlying collateral portfolio. Like other structured finance prod-
ucts, the securities issued by the CLO have a strict seniority ranking. The equity
tranche takes the first losses of the underlying portfolio and the senior tranche only
suffers losses if all other tranches have already defaulted. The securities issued by the
CLO are backed by an asset portfolio, which mainly consists of leveraged loans. These
loans are tradable on a secondary market and allow for a manager who, besides the
initial selection and purchase of the loan portfolio, purchases and sells leveraged loans
throughout the CLO’s lifetime.
A leveraged loan is defined as “a syndicated loan given to a non-investment-grade
company or a loan that exceeds a certain interest threshold, for instance, LIBOR +
125 basis points” (LSTA, 2013). As we can see from the definition, leveraged loans are
loans to risky corporations.1 In addition, leveraged loans are syndicated, meaning that
a lead bank, called the arranger, organizes the loan issuance with several counterparties
to raise the required volume. At issuance, the arranger searches for investors to co-
finance the loan, which makes it relatively easy for CLOs to purchase leveraged loans.
On the other hand, selling a leveraged loan is more difficult. While the notional amount
of leveraged loans outstanding is huge, there is a small secondary market for leveraged
loans, which makes it difficult to find a counterparty. Hence, as we explain in more
detail in the next section, a high CLO turnover can point to better managerial skill.
To understand the typical CLO and leveraged loan size, note that CLOs only
invest in a small fraction of a leveraged loan. The average leveraged loan notional is
approximately $523 million (e.g. Benmelech, Dlugosz, and Ivashina (2012)) while, in
our sample described in the following section, the average number of leveraged loans
in a CLO portfolio is 352 and the average CLO balance of USD-denominated CLOs is
approximately $510 million. Hence, a CLO manager only invests in a small fraction
1Lower-rated corporations who need to raise large amounts of debt that exceed normal loan volumes
have two financing options, issuing bonds or syndicated loans. See Denis and Mihov (2003) and
Altunbas, Kara, and Marques-Ibanez (2010) for more details on this trade-off.
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of a leveraged loan. The large number of leveraged loans is because the CLO manager
is required to hold a diversified loan portfolio that mitigates the default risk of the
senior tranches. We next discuss the CLO manager’s incentives and constraints in
more detail.
2.1 The Manager’s Incentives and Constraints
The CLO manager receives a compensation in the form of three different fees. First, a
senior fee, which is around 15 basis points of the CLO balance. Usually, this fee has the
highest priority in the cash flow waterfall and is paid to the manager before the interest
on the senior tranches. Second, a junior fee of approximately 30 basis points, which
is paid if all cash flows to senior and mezzanine tranches are made and the collateral
tests (described below) are met. Finally, an incentive fee is paid to the manager if
all the criteria for the junior fees are fulfilled and the CLO equity returns exceed a
pre-specified threshold. The incentive fee is approximately 20% of the payment to the
equity investors but can vary significantly across CLOs. This complex compensation
structure, combined with the fact that junior and senior tranche holders might have
different incentives, distinguishes CLOs from other actively managed portfolios such
as mutual funds.
Besides the complex compensation structure, the CLO manager has to comply with
a variety of constraints.2 As described by Aufsatz (2015) in an industry-research note,
there are three major constraints. First, the loan portfolio must fulfill a pre-specified
diversity score, avoiding concentration in specific issuers or industries. Second, man-
agers can only invest in “eligible” assets, which are assets that are consistent with the
structure of the CLO. For example, a manager of a U.S. CLO must allocate most of
the collateral portfolio to USD denominated assets. Third, the amount invested in
risky loans that are rated as CCC or below may not exceed a pre-specified threshold.
Hence, high portfolio turnover could also be due to rating deteriorations in the loan
portfolio, which force the CLO manager to sell CCC rated loans. We label forced
trades as “non-active trading” and next describe the different reasons for non-active
2In general, the CLO manager’s portfolio constraints are tighter in CLOs issued after the financial
crisis. Further, with the Volker rules becoming effective, CLO managers are also required to retain 5%
of the CLO risk on their own books.
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trading.
2.2 Active Trading and Non-Active Trading
The simplest reason for a non-active trade occurs when a loan in the collateral portfolio
matures. In that case, the manager uses the proceeds from the matured loan to invest
in new loan(s). Other non-active trades occur in the first 3-6 months after closing of
the CLO (referred to as the ramp-up period). In this period, the manager still needs to
purchase part of the initial collateral portfolio. Together with the potential difficulties
in selling leveraged loans, these simple reasons for non-active trading highlight that
loan sales are more informative for constructing a measure of active trading than loan
purchases.
As described above, one reason for non-active loan sales are binding portfolio re-
strictions. In addition to these portfolio restrictions, the CLO’s performance is mon-
itored through a variety of collateral tests, which ensure the safety of the senior debt
tranches. The most common collateral test is the over-collateralization (OC) test which
measures the cushion of the par value of the CLO assets relative to the par value of
the senior CLO tranche(s):
Asset Par
CLO Tranche Par
≥ Limit. (1.1)
The asset par value is the sum of the notional value of all performing loans and the
notional value of all non-performing loans, which enter at a haircut. The CLO tranche
par value is the current par amount of outstanding principal for the respective CLO
tranche. If the tranche is not the most senior one, the CLO tranche par is the sum of
the tranche par and all tranches above it in seniority. If the test result (1.1) is below
the limit, the OC test is breached, which forces the CLO manager to sell part of the
loan portfolio and repay a fraction of the debt tranches to comply with the test limit
again. This is another reason for a non-active loan sale.
Overall, a large amount of non-active transactions is an indicator of poor collateral
management rather than managerial skill. Therefore, to rule out that a sale was
enforced to repay debt tranches, we construct our measure of active trading as one
where loan sales and loan purchases occur within a small time window. Matching a
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loan sale with a loan purchase ensures that the manager is selling the loan to purchase
new loans instead of selling the loan to repay tranche holders. In contrast to non-active
trades, these trades are more likely based on the manager’s view about the underlying
credits regarding rating changes or changes in credit spreads.
While a simultaneous sale and purchase of different leveraged loans is more likely
to positively influence the CLO performance, the CLO manager might simply sell
loans with a high market value and buy loans with a lower market value but a higher
principal value instead. This transaction is called “par building”. A CLO manager
engaging in par building avoids an OC test breach because the transaction increases
the par value of the asset portfolio, thereby increasing the test cushion. In contrast to
active trading based on managerial insights, it is not obvious that par building affects
collateral default rates or CLO equity returns.
Finally, the CLO trading activity can vary over its lifetime, which comprises the
following three periods. First, the first 3–6 months after issuance, called ramp-up pe-
riod. As mentioned above, the CLO manager still purchases parts of the loan portfolio
in this period. However, given that we measure active turnover by matching loan sales
to loan purchases, we do not expect this period to affect our active turnover measure.
Second, the reinvestment period starts, which follows after the ramp-up period and
lasts for 3–6 years. In this period, the CLO manager can reinvest the proceeds from
maturing loans and loan sales in new loans. Finally, in the amortization period, which
starts after the reinvestment period, the CLO manager must dedicate most cash flows
from maturing loans and loan sales to debt repayments. In this period, we expect
active loan trading to be significantly lower than in the first two periods. Overall, this
discussion shows that CLO age is an important control variable.
3 Data and Variable Construction
We describe the underlying data of our analysis in this section. Our dataset contains
information on the CLO structure and performance, the underlying collateral portfo-
lios, and collateral transactions conducted by the CLO managers. The data source is
the Creditflux CLO-i database and we focus our analysis on U.S. CLOs and the period
from January 2009 to December 2016. In this section we first describe the sample of
10
CLOs we use in our analysis and summarize our sample of loan transactions executed
by CLOs. Afterwards, we construct our active and non-active turnover measures.
3.1 CLO Data
We apply the following four filters to the CLO-i database. First, we require the CLOs
to report both tranche information and equity returns. These are the minimum infor-
mation necessary to understand the CLO structure. Second, we drop CLOs where we
are unable to identify the equity tranche, which is important to compute the CLO’s
leverage ratio and annualized equity payment. Third, we remove observations where
the CLO’s original tranche balance deviates from the median original balance of the
CLO. If over 20% of the original balance observations deviate from the median, we
deem that we are unable to determine the true original balance of the CLO and remove
the CLO from the sample.3 Finally, to avoid strong outliers driving our results, we
remove observations where the CLO repaid over 50% of the original balance. CLOs
that have repaid half of their original balance, tend to report extremely high default
rates and/or high equity payments.4 Our final sample comprises 892 CLOs.
The two main performance measures in our analysis are the payments to the most
junior tranche holders, called equity payments, and collateral default rates, which
measure the percentage of loans in default for each CLO. Panel A of Table 1.1 reports
summary statistics of the different CLO characteristics and performance measures in
our filtered database. As we can see from the table, the average annualized equity
payment is 19.72% with a standard deviation of 8.30%. While annual equity payment
is the annual percentage return that CLO equity investors receive on their initial
investment, these numbers are not the return on equity because the equity payment
also includes return of principal. We address this potential issue in Section 5.2, where
we compute the IRR for a subsample of closed CLOs and test the impact of active
turnover on these figures. Finally, the average collateral default rate in our CLO sample
is 1.65%, with a high standard deviation of 4.59%.
3Changes in the original balance are a clear mistake and happen, for example, when the reports
for some tranches are missing in some months. This filter is relatively harsh and leads us to drop 77
CLOs. In addition, we remove outliers in another 186 CLOs, where the original balance deviates in
some months.
4Our results are robust to using other cut-off values, such as 20% or 90%.
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Panel A of Table 1.1 also shows that the percentage of CCC or below rated loans
is, on average, 5.95%, and almost four times as high as the percentage of defaulted
loans. The average CLO size is $510 million and CLOs hold, on average, 352 differ-
ent leveraged loans in their portfolio, which is in line with Benmelech, Dlugosz, and
Ivashina (2012). Family size shown in Table 1.1 gives the number of CLOs under the
same CLO manager. On average, a CLO manager handles 12.62 CLOs, although there
is a large cross-sectional variation in family size, ranging from a 10% quantile of 2.54
to a 90% quantile of 24.88. On average, CLOs have an equity share of 10.53% and are
41.94 months old. Finally, for a subset of CLOs, we also have information on the fee
structure and note that the median senior and junior fees are 20 basis points and 30
basis points, respectively.
3.2 Transaction Data
We next describe the sample of CLO collateral transactions, which enables us to obtain
insights into leveraged loan transactions. The observations include information on
the loan in question, the transaction price, and the transaction date. The dataset
comprises purchases and sales made by CLOs in our filtered sample and we focus on
term leveraged loans, denominated in US dollars, which comprise over 90% of the
transaction data sample. We delete observations with obvious reporting mistakes in
the price or the size of the transaction, namely zero or negative values or prices above
$120 or below $15.5 Finally, 14% of the transactions have a price equal to $100, which
is most likely a default value used when the actual transaction price is not observed.
We delete these observations from our sample but note that the results are robust to
including transactions with a price equal to $100.
We report summary statistics of transaction prices, trade size, loan rating, and
loan maturity in Panel B of Table 1.1. The sample comprises almost half a million
transactions with 196,312 sales and 280,612 purchases, indicating that approximately
one third of the purchased loans are held until the loan either matures or defaults. The
average transaction size is $1.06 million, ranging from a 10% quantile of $0.13 million
to a 90% quantile of $2.45 million. Splitting these numbers into loan purchases and
5Most of these misreportings occur in the early part of the sample.
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sales, the average transaction size is $1.2 million and $0.8 million, respectively (we do
not report these separate numbers in the table to conserve space). The credit rating
and loan maturity are available for a subsample of 245,179 and 343,870 of the traded
loans respectively. The average traded loan has a rating of B+ and a time to maturity
of 4.98 years. Again, splitting these numbers into purchases and sales, the loans in our
sample have 5.2 years to maturity and are B+ rated on average when purchased, and
have 4.5 years to maturity and are B rated on average when they are sold.
3.3 The Active Trading Measure
As noted in section 2.2, a CLO manager can be forced to sell loans (e.g. after a
collateral test breach) or to purchase new loans if part of the collateral portfolio ma-
tures. Hence, we need to distinguish between these non-active trades and active trades
which occur at the CLO manager’s discretion. To distinguish active from non-active
trades, we first identify active sales by matching the cash flows from loan sales at day
i (CFSalesi ) to the cash flows of loan purchases (CF
Purch
i ) executed within a 3-day
window:
ActiveSalei,3 := min
(
CFSalesi , CF
Purch
k∈[i−3,i+3]
)
. (1.2)
Equation 1.2 identifies transactions where the manager has sold part of the loan port-
folio to purchase new loans.
We then construct our measure of active turnover as follows. On each day we
compute ActiveSalei,3, where we remove any previously matched purchases to avoid
double-counting of loan purchases. Afterwards, we aggregate all active sales within
quarter t and divide this figure by the total CLO liabilities in quarter t. In summary,
our measure of active turnover is defined as:
ActiveTurnovert :=
∑
i∈t
ActiveSalei,3
CLO Tranche Part
. (1.3)
Next, we construct a measure of non-active turnover that comprises all sales without
matching expenses from loan purchases. As before, we take the sum of all non-active
transactions in quarter t and divide by the total CLO liabilities in quarter t. In contrast
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to the 3-day window for active trades, we use a 7-day window to identify non-active
trades to ensure that there is no matching purchase withing a short time window.6
Our measure for non-active trading is defined as:
PassiveTurnovert :=
∑
i∈t
CFSalesi −ActiveSalei,7
CLO Tranche Part
. (1.4)
Panel C of Table 1.1 provides summary statistics for the active and non-active
turnover measures. Active turnover is on average 1.38%. It varies from a 10% quantile
of 0.22% to a 90% quantile of 2.66%, illustrating that there is a large variation in
trading activity across CLOs. Non-active turnover is on average 0.78%, ranging from
a 10% quantile of 0.05% to a 90% quantile of 1.53%. The median active turnover is
0.99% and the median non-active turnover is 0.45%, indicating that approximately two
thirds of the loan sales are classified as “active”.
4 Understanding Active and Non-Active Turnover
In this section, we explore the loan transaction data in two steps. First, we compare
active and non-active loan sales and test if the nature of the transaction affects the sale
price and has predictive power for the future credit rating of the sold loan. Afterwards,
we investigate the drivers of active turnover and non-active turnover, testing if the
trading behavior of a CLO is linked to its characteristics or its collateral portfolio.
4.1 Active and Non-Active Loan Sales
In this section, we focus our analysis on loan sales because our construction of the
active turnover measure allows for an easy identification of “active sales”, i.e., sales for
the purpose of portfolio rebalancing. By contrast, loan purchases are more frequent
and distinguishing “active purchases” from purchases that occur, say, to replace a
maturing loan, is difficult. To explore the difference between active and non-active
loan sales, we run panel regressions of the following form:
6Our results are robust to using different time windows, like using the same 3-day window for
both active and non-active turnover or using the same 7-day window for both active and non-active
turnover.
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Pricei,t = α+ β
ActiveFracActivei,t+
+ βTTMTTMi,t + β
Principal log(Principal)i,t + β
RatingRatingi,t + εi,t. (1.5)
In a first step, we regress the sale price of loan i at time t on FracActivei,t – the
fraction of notional for each sale that we can match to a purchase within a 3-day
window – which is defined as:
FracActivei,t :=
ActiveSalei,t
CFSalesi,t
.
We assign the same FracActive if multiple sales occur on the same day. In that
specification, the intercept α corresponds to the average sale price and βActive can be
interpreted as the difference between a non-active and an active sale. As shown in the
first panel of Table 1.2, active sales are executed at significantly higher prices compared
to non-active sales. On average, an active sale is conducted at a $1.612 higher price
(relative to a price of $93.475) compared to a non-active trade. The difference between
active and non-active trades is statistically significant at a 1% level. In a second step,
we add year-month fixed effects, the loan time to maturity, loan transaction principal,
and loan rating, as controls. As shown, in the second panel of Table 1.2, the difference
between active and non-active sales remains significant at a 1% level, despite a drop
in the economic significance of active trading.
In addition to the price tests, we investigate if more active sales contain more
information about the future credit quality of a loan issuer by testing their predictive
power for rating downgrades. To that end, we compute the rating change for each
transaction as change from current rating to the credit rating in six months, which we
compute as the average credit rating among all available transactions of that loan after
six months of the transaction date. We then replace Pricei,t in Equation (1.5) with
Rating Changei,t and repeat our analysis. The last two panels of Table 1.2 exhibit
the results of the rating change test. The third panel shows the results without adding
controls and we can again interpret the intercept as the average rating change and
βActive as the difference between active and non-active loan sales. While the intercept is
15
not significantly different from zero, FracActivei,t is significantly negative, suggesting
that the loan quality tends to deteriorate after an active sale. Taken together, the
results in the third panel suggest that, approximately, one out of 11 actively sold loans
is downgraded within six months of the loan sale. The results remain robust to adding
time to maturity, principal amount, current rating, and time fixed effects as controls.
Overall, these findings suggest that active CLO trades are executed at better prices
and before the credit quality of the underlying loan deteriorates. Next, we investigate
the drivers for active and non-active CLO turnover.
4.2 The Drivers of Active and Non-Active Turnover
We run a panel regression of active CLO turnover and non-active CLO turnover on
the following form:
Turnoveri,t = α+ β
Size log(Sizei,t) + β
AgeAgei,t + β
Reinv1{t≤Reinvi,t}(t) + β
FamFamily Sizei,t
+ βRetEquity Reti,t + β
ESEquity Sharei,t + β
Test1{Test breachi,t} + β
DefPerc Defi,t+
βTTMAvgTTMi,t + β
DiversifDiversifi,t + εi,t. (1.6)
The first set of explanatory variables is related to the CLO characteristics and life-
time. They include the CLO size (Sizei,t) and Age (Agei,t), a dummy variable that is
equal to one if the CLO is still in its reinvestment period (1{t≤Reinvesti}), the number
of CLOs under the same management firm (Family Sizei,t), the annualized payments
to equity investors in the current period (Equity Reti,t), and the ratio between eq-
uity tranche balance and total CLO balance (Equity Sharei,t). In a second step, we
add control variables that capture the quality of the CLO collateral portfolio. These
variables include a dummy variable that is equal to one if a senior OC test has been
breached (1{Test breachi,t}), the percentage of defaulted loans in the collateral portfo-
lio (Perc Defi,t), the average time to maturity of the loan portfolio (AvgTTMi,t),
and a measure of portfolio diversification (Diversifi,t).
7 The results from this panel
regression are exhibited in Table 1.3.
7The measure of portfolio diversification is constructed as follows: First, we compute the percentage
of loans within a certain industry held by the CLO. Second, we compute an Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index (HHI) of the portfolio holdings, that is, we compute the sum of squared industry percentages.
Finally, we use 1 − HHI
10,000
as our proxy for portfolio diversification, where we divide by the highest
possible HHI, which is 10, 000.
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We examine active CLO turnover in the first two panels and non-active turnover
in the last two panels. In both cases, we first use explanatory variables capturing CLO
characteristics and add controls for the portfolio holdings in a second step. Examining
the results, the adjusted R2 values suggest that CLO characteristics explain more
of the variation in active turnover compared to non-active turnover. The additional
portfolio holding controls double the explanatory power of our regressions for non-
active turnover but only lead to a small increase in adjusted R2 for active turnover.
Turning to the regression coefficients, we first observe a higher active turnover
and a lower non-active turnover for larger CLOs, indicating that a larger portfolio
enables a collateral manager to trade more. Age and Reinvestment Dummy suggest
that younger CLOs and CLOs still in their reinvestment period engage in more active
trading, while there is a significant increase in non-active trading after the reinvestment
period. Interestingly, the CLO family size is an insignificant explanatory variable which
tends to lower active and non-active turnover, suggesting that CLOs under the same
manager do not trade significantly more with each other. Higher equity returns increase
both active turnover and non-active turnover and we explore the relationship between
active turnover and equity returns in more detail in the following section. Finally,
CLOs with a larger equity share exhibit both more active trading and more non-active
trading.
Inspecting the results after adding CLO collateral portfolio controls reveals that
CLOs with a worse quality of collateral do less active trading. Active turnover drops
after test breaches and is lower for CLOs with more defaulted collateral. The opposite
is true for non-active turnover which increases if a test breach occurs and if collat-
eral default rates increase. The remaining two controls are only significant for active
turnover. CLOs that have a collateral portfolio with a longer average time to maturity
have a higher active turnover. Portfolio time to maturity tends to have the opposite ef-
fect for non-active turnover. Finally, better diversified CLOs have more active trading
and less non-active trading.
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5 Analyzing CLOs with Different Trading Activity
Motivated by the results from the previous section, we next test our main hypothesis:
CLOs with high active turnover trade at better prices and outperform CLOs with low
active turnover. To test this hypothesis, we split the overall sample of CLOs into
three buckets (high active turnover, medium active turnover, and low active turnover)
and run two sets of tests. First, we test whether CLOs with higher active turnover
trade loans at better prices than CLOs with a lower turnover. Afterwards, we form
the portfolios based on turnover in the previous quarter and test if active turnover or
non-active turnover can predict CLO performance in the next quarter.
5.1 More Active CLOs Trade at Better Prices
We first compare loan transactions by high and low turnover CLOs. To get CLO port-
folios with significantly different active turnover, we use the quarterly active turnover
measure described in Section 3.3 and form three portfolios: High turnover, medium
turnover, and low turnover. The portfolio formation is based on the active trading
measure within the same quarter and we rebalance the portfolios every quarter. Fig-
ure 1.1 shows that high turnover CLOs buy and sell leveraged loans at better prices
than low turnover CLOs. Figure 1.1 (a) shows that more active CLOs sell more lever-
aged loans above par value while less active CLOs sell more loans with a market value
below 55%. Figure 1.1 (b) shows that the picture is reversed for purchases, where less
active CLOs tend to purchase loans at par value.
Overall, Figure 1.1 suggests that high turnover and low turnover CLOs exhibit
different trading patterns, both when purchasing loans, where more active CLOs pay
less, and, even more so, when selling loans, where more active CLOs are able to sell
loans at much higher prices. In Panel A of Table 1.4 we test if there is a significant
difference between the transaction prices that more active and less active managers
obtain. We first compare the transactions of the most active and least active CLOs
and find that more active CLOs, on average, sell loans at 5.47% higher prices (t-statistic
of 5.15) than less active CLOs. More active CLOs also purchase cheaper loans than
less active CLOs, but the average difference of −0.37% (t-statistic of −2.54) is small
compared to the difference in sale prices. Note that these results do not control for
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loan type or the timing of the loan trade. That is, we cannot yet claim that more active
investors get better prices when they trade assets with a similar risk. We investigate
this hypothesis next.
Trading and Prices
We now investigate the link between active trading and trade prices, proceeding in
four steps. First, we test if high turnover CLOs and low turnover CLOs trade at
different prices when trading the same loan in the same month. Second, we compare
the transaction prices of loans traded by high and low turnover CLOs at any point in
time. Third, we repeat our analysis on the CLO manager level instead of comparing
individual CLOs. Finally, we use a subset of transactions with the same principal
balance to control for transaction size.
Investigating trades of the same loan, executed in the same month, we compare
the average transaction prices for high turnover, medium turnover and low turnover
CLOs in Panel B of Table 1.4. For each loan and each month, we compute the median
sale and purchase price for high, medium, and low turnover CLOs. We then use the
subset of loan-months where both high and low turnover CLOs sell the same loan in the
same month and report the average sale price of high turnover, medium turnover, and
low turnover CLOs. We find that high turnover CLOs, on average, get 9 cents more
on a $94 transaction when selling the same loan in the same month as low turnover
CLOs. This difference of 9 cents is statistically significant at a 1% level despite its
low economical significance. For loan purchases, we find that high turnover CLOs, on
average, pay 5 cents less buying the same loan in the same month as low turnover
CLOs. As for sales, the difference in price is statistically significant at a 1% level
despite its low economic significance.
So far, these results document that high turnover CLOs get better prices than
low turnover CLOs when trading the same loan in the same month. However, the
9 cents difference in sales is surprisingly small compared to the sale price difference
of $5.47 we found when we did not match on loan-months. Hence, we next consider
the subset of loans sold by both high and low turnover CLOs without requiring that
the transactions occurred within the same month. We focus on loan sales because the
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difference in unmatched transaction prices is more than 50 times larger than for the
matched transactions. As explained above, a higher difference for loan sales is intuitive
because finding a potential loan buyer is more difficult than purchasing a new loan on
the primary market.
Turning to our second test, for each of the loan transactions and for each CLO
turnover group, we compute the median sale price, sale date, and credit rating at the
median sale date of all sales. We report the averages of these values across loans for
each turnover group in Panel B of Table 1.4 (last three rows). We find a difference
of $0.95 in transaction prices when a high turnover CLO sells the same loan as a
low turnover CLO. Moreover, a high turnover CLO sells 111 days earlier than a low
turnover CLO and the average numerical rating of the loans at the time they are sold
is 7.4 for high turnover CLOs and 7.31 for low turnover CLOs. Though both numerical
ratings correspond to a credit rating of B, there is a statistically significant difference
in credit ratings for the two groups. Hence, high turnover CLOs tend to sell loans with
better ratings than low turnover CLOs. Taken together, the results in Panel B suggest
that more active CLOs get better prices when high and low turnover CLOs trade
the same loan simultaneously. Furthermore, when we compare transactions without
matching the transaction month, we find that active CLOs sell earlier, at a better
price, and while the loan has a better credit rating.
Alternative Explanations?
As we have seen in Table 1.1, the average CLO manager is in charge of 12 different
CLOs, which raises two potential concerns. First, industry practitioners indicated to
us that several of the trades executed by individual CLOs could occur within the same
family, for example, when a CLO manager wants to sell the same loan in various CLOs
he would first transfer the loans to one CLO to sell them as one bundle. We alleviate
this concern by excluding transactions executed at a price of $100, which is the most
common price for these transactions. Second, Eisele, Nefedova, and Parise (2016) find
that, for mutual funds, trades within the same fund family are more likely executed at
a different price than the market price. They hypothesize that mutual fund managers
use transactions within the same family to improve the performance of one “star fund”.
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Hence, we next analyze whether our results remain intact if we compare CLO families
instead of individual CLOs.
Hence, we investigate the results on the manager level in our third test. We first
aggregate CLO turnover at the manager level and define manager turnover as the
weighted average of the turnover of all CLOs under the same manager. We then sort
CLO managers into high turnover, medium turnover, and low turnover buckets. Panel
C of Table 1.4 exhibits the results for the manager level tests, following the same
logic we used for individual CLOs in Panel B. As before, for each loan in the sample,
we determine the median sale price, median sale date, and rating at the median sale
date. We find that, on average, the high turnover managers earn $0.59 more on a
transaction of $95 when they sell the same loan as a low turnover manager. Moreover,
active managers sell, on average, 73 days earlier than the passive managers and tend
to sell loans with a better rating. Overall, the manager level results are consistent
with the individual CLO level tests: Compared to less active managers, more active
managers trade earlier, at better prices, and while the loans have a higher credit rating.
Hence, we can rule out that the better transaction prices are only driven by a spurious
manager effect, arising, for example from managers shifting loans across CLOs.
In our analysis up to this point, we did not control for transaction size even though
it might influence prices. In stock markets larger transactions have a higher price
impact and therefore a large sale drives the price down. The opposite is true in
corporate bond markets where large participants, who are typically behind the large
transactions, are better negotiators and therefore capable of obtaining tighter bid-
ask spreads (see, for example, Feldhu¨tter (2012)) and higher sale prices. Hence, the
transaction volume can influence the sale price, although it is not a priori clear in which
direction. To control for transaction size, we next analyze a subset of transactions with
a similar volume.
CLOs execute sales at a wide range of transaction sizes but one large transaction
cluster is around $1,000,000. We therefore use a subset of transactions within the
range of $900,000 to $1,100,000 to test the impact of transaction size. The results
are exhibited in Panel D of Table 1.4. We report the same results as before but only
include transactions with a size between $900,000 and $1,100,000, and consider loans
sold at least once by both high and low turnover CLOs at the appropriate transactions
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size. For each loan we compute the median price, the median transaction date and the
loan rating at the median date, again only considering transactions of the appropriate
size, and report averages across loans.
We find that, in this subsample, high turnover CLOs earn $1.19 more when selling
the same loan as low turnover CLOs. High turnover CLOs sell 139 days earlier and
when the loans are 0.19 notches higher rated. Overall, Panel D of Table 1.4 suggests
that the positive relation between high trading activity and favorable prices is even
stronger when focusing on large transactions with a similar volume (recall that the
average transaction size for loan sales is $0.8 million). Hence, Panel D suggests that
the benefit of being more active is stronger when the CLO sells larger shares of the
loan portfolio.
5.2 More Active CLOs Perform Better
Next, we investigate whether the payments to equity tranche holders and the collateral
default rates differ between high and low turnover CLOs. As before, we form portfolios
based on active turnover now using the turnover in quarter t − 1 to classify CLOs as
high turnover, medium turnover, or low turnover and to predict CLO performance in
quarter t. First, we use the active turnover measure constructed in Section 3.3 and test
if there is a significant difference between the equity returns and default rates of high
active turnover and low active turnover CLOs. We then run a placebo test with the
non-active turnover measure described in Section 3.3. In this placebo test, we form
three CLO portfolios based on their non-active trading activity in quarter t − 1 and
analyze the difference between equity returns and default rates in the three portfolios.
As we can see from Panel A of Table 1.5, there is a significant difference between
active turnover in quarter t for CLOs with a high turnover in quarter t− 1 and CLOs
with a low turnover in quarter t − 1. Moreover, annualized equity payments decrease
monotonically from CLOs with high turnover to CLOs with low turnover and there is
a difference of 2.20% (t-statistic of 2.27) between the high and low turnover groups.
Similarly, default rates increase monotonically from high turnover to low turnover
CLOs and the difference between the high and low turnover groups is −0.76% (t-
statistic of −5.93). Overall, these findings suggest that more active turnover predicts
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better CLO performance.
Turning to our placebo test with non-active turnover, we first note that more
non-active turnover should not improve the CLO performance. If anything, a higher
non-active turnover may indicate that the CLO is in financial distress which forces
it to sell part of the loan portfolio to redeem senior note holders. In line with this
intuition, Panel B of Table 1.5 shows that more non-active turnover does not predict a
significant difference in equity returns. However, CLOs with more non-active turnover
have significantly higher default rates with a difference of 1.79% (t-statistic 2.40),
compared to CLOs with less non-active turnover. Hence, more non-active turnover is
indeed an indicator for deteriorations in the credit quality of the loan portfolio.
Making Money with Investments in Active CLOs
In this subsection, we investigate whether CLO investors could use our active turnover
measure to guide their investment choices. To that end, we compute the average active
turnover of each CLO in the first observed year and split the CLO sample into three
portfolios, based on first-year active turnover. We then form three portfolios, using the
remaining performance data. This split ensures that, in theory, an investor is capable
of observing the active turnover of CLO managers and then follow a buy and hold
strategy in the most active CLOs.
In line with our previous results, Panel C of Table 1.5 shows that more active
CLOs outperform less active CLOs. CLOs with the most active turnover have an
average equity payment of 24.99% while CLOs with the least active turnover only pay
an average of 20.58% to their investors. Similarly, the percentage of defaulted loans
is almost twice as high for the least active CLOs when compared to the most active
CLOs. In addition, we use a subset of closed CLOs for which we observe all cash
flows to compute the internal rate of return (IRR). Using the IRR instead of equity
payments enables us to obtain a cleaner measure of CLO performance which is not
affected by notional repayments. Comparing the IRR for high active turnover and low
active turnover CLOs, we find a striking difference: CLOs with a high initial active
turnover have an IRR of 14% compared to an IRR of 2% for the CLOs with a low
initial turnover.
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6 Regression Analysis
The previous section shows that CLOs with a higher active turnover trade at better
prices and outperform less active CLOs. We now test the robustness of this finding
in a regression setting, which enables us to control for other CLO or loan-specific
characteristics.
6.1 More Active Turnover and Better Transaction Prices
In this section we further investigate the link between transaction prices and active
CLO turnover by running panel regressions of transaction prices – separately for sales
and purchases – on the active turnover measure, controlling for the time to maturity
(TTMi,t), principal (Principali,t), and rating (Ratingi,t) of the transaction, as well as
a variety of CLO and collateral portfolio characteristics:
Pricei,t = αi + β
ActiveTurnoverActivei,t + β
TTMTTMi,t
+βPrincipalPrincipali,t + β
RatingRatingi,t + γControlsj,t + εi,t. (1.7)
In the above regression, the subscipt i, t refers to a specific loan trade while the sub-
script j, t refers to a specific CLO characteristic at the time of the trade. TurnoverActivej,t
is the active turnover measure constructed in Section 3.3 and we add time and loan
type fixed effects to all regressions. In a second step, we add Controlsj,t, which are at
the CLO level and include the ten explanatory variables from Equation (1.6) that we
used before to explain active turnover in Section 4.2.
As we can see from Table 1.6, active turnover is a significant explanatory variable
for both sales and purchases. To interpret the coefficient on TurnoverActivej,t we note
that the standard deviation of active turnover is 0.04 and, hence, a one standard
deviation increase in active turnover corresponds to a 5.268 × 0.04 = 0.211 dollar
increase in sale price, after controlling for other CLO characteristics. Similarly, a one
standard deviation increase in TurnoverActivej,t corresponds to a 0.242 dollar drop in
purchase prices.
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6.2 More Active Turnover and Better CLO Performance
In this section we further investigate the relationship between active turnover and CLO
performance. As in Section 4, we use the payoffs to CLO equity holders as a proxy for
CLO returns and the percentage of defaulted loans in the CLO collateral portfolio as
a measure of the CLO’s riskiness. We then test whether our measures of active and
non-active turnover have any predictive power for equity returns and default rates. In
contrast to Section 4, we now estimate the impact of active turnover on returns and
portfolio defaults using a panel regressions with the following controls:
Perfj,t = α+ β
ActiveTurnoverActivej,t−1 + γ
CLOControlsCLOj,t + γ
CollatControlsCollatj,t + εj,t.
(1.8)
The dependent variable in this regression is either equity payment (the annualized
cash return to equity holders), or percentage default (the average quarterly collateral
default rate). We regress these performance measures on TurnoverActivei,t−1 which is
the lagged quarterly active turnover measure we constructed in Section 3.3, gradually
adding the ten explanatory variables from Equation 1.6 that we used before to explain
active turnover in Section 4.2. In a first step we only use the controls related to the
CLO structure and add controls related to the collateral portfolio and time fixed effects
in a second step.
As shown in Table 1.7, active turnover is statistically significant for all four model
specifications. From the first two specifications, we can see that a higher active turnover
predicts a lower percentage of defaulted loans in a CLO portfolio. In the baseline
specification, a one standard deviation increase in active turnover, corresponding to
4%, predicts a decrease of 0.16% in the collateral default rate. Adding portfolio controls
and time fixed effects approximately halves the economic and statistical significance of
the coefficient. From the last two regression specifications in Table 1.7 we can see that
a higher active turnover predicts higher equity payments. In the baseline specification,
a one standard deviation increase in active turnover predicts a 1% increase in equity
payments. The effect remains significant after adding collateral controls and time fixed
effects.
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Overall, Table 1.7 shows that more trading activity improves CLO performance.
This improved performance is reflected in both higher equity returns, which benefit
equity tranche holders and lower default rates, which tend to benefit both equity and
senior tranche holders.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyze a novel set of leveraged loan transactions executed by man-
agers of CLOs. After constructing a measure for active portfolio turnover of CLOs, we
find that active loan sales are executed at better prices and predict rating downgrades.
In addition, CLOs with a higher trading activity trade at better prices than CLOs with
a lower trading activity. This finding is robust to controlling for transaction size and
tests on the manager level instead of the individual CLO level. Moreover, we document
that more active CLOs trade earlier than less active CLOs and sell loans with a higher
credit rating. In addition to these trade-level tests, we find that higher active turnover
predicts higher equity returns and lower CLO portfolio default rates. This finding
is in line with previous research on active versus passive management in the case of
equities, showing that more active managers are capable of outperforming the market.
Placebo tests with an alternative turnover measure which captures non-active trading
lead to insignificant or qualitatively different results, suggesting that our measure of
active turnover is capable of capturing a unique skill of CLO managers.
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Figure 1.1: Do CLOs with high active turnover trade at better prices? We
categorize transactions as high turnover, medium turnover, and low turnover based
on the active turnover of the CLO which executed the transaction. The measure for
active turnover is defined in Section 3.3. The figure shows the empirical distribution
of the median sale price (panel (a)) or median purchase price (panel (b)), respectively.
For each loan we find the median high turnover and low turnover price over the full
sample period of transactions and include the median prices in the computation of the
empirical density. The sample period is January 2009 to December 2016. The sample
of transactions consists of loans that are sold by both high and low turnover CLOs in
this period.
27
Table 1.1: Summary Statistics. This table reports summary statistics of our filtered
CLO and loan trade sample. Panel A reports CLO performance measures and other
characteristics. Panel B reports summary statistics for loan transactions executed by
CLOs in our sample. Panel C reports the summary statistics for the active and non-
active turnover measures constructed in Equations (1.3) and (1.4). We report mean,
standard deviation (std), 10% quantile (10%), median, 90% quantile (90%), and the
number of observations (N) for transaction price and transaction size. In Panels A and
C, we first compute CLO lifetime averages of all variables and then use these averages
to compute mean, standard deviation (std), 10% quantile (10%), median, and 90%
quantile (90%). The number of observations in Panels A and C refer to the number of
CLOs with available data. The sample period for all data is January 2009 to December
2016.
Mean std 10% Median 90% N
Panel A: CLO characteristics
Equity payment (%) 19.72 8.30 10.39 19.67 27.58 892
Default (%) 1.65 4.59 0.00 0.65 4.00 892
CCC bucket (%) 5.95 3.29 2.68 5.40 9.62 892
Original size 509.48 201.78 333.79 499.45 712.19 892
Family size 12.62 10.04 2.54 10.19 24.88 892
# Loans 352.24 187.11 158.65 318.93 602.47 892
Equity share (%) 10.53 5.11 7.90 9.45 13.17 892
Age (months) 41.94 29.74 8.26 32.05 80.89 892
Panel B: Transaction Data
Sale price 94.57 12.16 83.12 99.01 100.50 196,312
Purchase price 97.36 5.48 92.50 99.00 100.25 280,612
Transaction size (mill $) 1.06 1.41 0.13 0.69 2.45 476,924
Rating B+ 1.67 B- B BB 245,179
Maturity (years) 4.98 1.60 2.70 5.12 7.00 343,870
Panel C: Turnover measures
Active turnover (%) 1.38 1.65 0.22 0.99 2.66 855
Non-active turnover (%) 0.78 1.44 0.05 0.45 1.53 855
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Table 1.2: Comparing active and non-active trades. This table exhibits the
results of regressing sale prices and future rating changes on FracActive, the fraction
of sales notional that can be matched to a purchase within a 3-day window. TTM,
log(Principal), and Rating are the time to maturity, principal amount sold, and rating,
of the loan transaction. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors, clustered at the
issuer level are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at a 1%,
5%, and 10% level respectively. The sample period is January 2009 to December 2016.
Sale Price Rating Change
Intercept 93.475∗∗∗ 36.582∗∗∗ −0.035 0.078
(0.633) (4.484) (0.045) (0.681)
FracActive 1.612∗∗∗ 0.645∗∗∗ −0.053∗ −0.074∗∗
(0.300) (0.184) (0.031) (0.030)
TTM 0.573∗∗∗ 0.019
(0.157) (0.022)
log(Principal) 0.504∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗
(0.159) (0.018)
Rating 2.921∗∗∗ −0.091∗∗∗
(0.238) (0.029)
Time FE No Y es No Y es
Observations 172,580 132,437 60,206 45,974
Adjusted R2 0.004 0.415 0.000 0.080
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Table 1.3: What drives active and non-active trading? This table exhibits the
results of regressing active turnover and non-active turnover on the indicated variables.
log(Size) is the logarithm of the total balance of the CLO debt tranche. Age is the age
of the CLO in years. Reinvest dummy is an indicator variable that equals one if the
CLO is still in the reinvestment period and zero otherwise. Family size is the number
of CLOs under the same manager. Equity return is the annualized payment to equity
tranche holders. Equity share is the ratio between the CLO equity tranche and the
CLO debt balance. Test breach dummy is a dummy variable that equals one if the
CLO had an OC test breach and zero otherwise. Percent default is the percentage
of defaulted loans in the collateral portfolio. Average TTM is the average time to
maturity of the CLO loan portfolio in years. Diversification is a diversification score
based on the Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index that is described in more detail in Section
4. The numbers in parentheses are Newey-West t-statistics. ***, **, and * indicate
significance at a 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. The sample period is January
2009 to December 2016, including all CLOs from our filtered sample.
Active Turnover Non-Active Turnover
Intercept −9.39∗∗∗ −11.94∗∗∗ 5.76 11.69∗∗∗
(2.15) (2.25) (3.51) (4.25)
log(Size) 0.55∗∗∗ 0.53∗∗∗ −0.34∗ −0.55∗∗
(0.11) (0.11) (0.18) (0.22)
Age (years) −0.25∗∗∗ −0.14∗∗∗ −0.09∗∗ −0.24∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.09)
Reinvest dummy 1.50∗∗∗ 1.57∗∗∗ −0.97∗∗∗ −1.28∗∗∗
(0.12) (0.12) (0.23) (0.24)
Family size −0.33 −0.71∗∗ −0.22 0.83
(0.32) (0.33) (0.44) (0.59)
Equity return (%) 1.22∗∗∗ 0.62∗∗∗ 4.89∗∗ 6.70∗∗∗
(0.29) (0.23) (2.08) (2.45)
Equity share 5.59∗∗∗ 6.90∗∗∗ 18.96∗∗ 14.54∗∗
(1.68) (1.65) (8.85) (6.09)
Test breach dummy −1.22∗∗∗ 0.85
(0.21) (1.23)
Percent default −5.93∗∗∗ 30.35∗∗
(1.30) (13.32)
Average TTM 0.36∗∗∗ −0.07
(0.06) (0.20)
Diversification 1.04∗∗∗ −1.22
(0.26) (1.08)
Observations 8,626 8,483 8,626 8,483
Adjusted R2 0.15 0.17 0.06 0.12
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Table 1.4: CLOs with high active turnover trade at better prices. We cate-
gorize transactions as high turnover, medium turnover, and low turnover based on the
active turnover of the CLO which executed the transaction in Panels A, B and D, or
based on the aggregate active turnover of the CLO manager in Panel C. The active
turnover measure is defined in Section 3.3. Panel A shows the average transaction
prices without matching the same loans. In Panels B–D we start with the sample of
loans that are traded by both high turnover and low turnover CLOs. For each loan
and for each turnover group we compute the median sale price over the full sample
length, the median sale date, and numerical rating (defined in Section 4) at the me-
dian sale date. We then report averages of the median values across loans and test if
high and low turnover values are significantly different. The addition (same month)
indicates that we match transactions by high turnover and low turnover CLOs of the
same loan executed in the same month. Panel D shows the results for a subset of
transactions with a transaction size between USD 900,000 and USD 1,100,000. ***,
**, and * indicate significance at a 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. The sample
period is January 2009 to December 2016.
High Medium Low High
Turnover Turnover Turnover - Low [t-stat]
Panel A: Results without matching loans
Sale price 94.07 91.57 88.60 5.47*** [5.15]
Purchase price 96.56 96.73 96.93 −0.37** [-2.54]
Panel B: Results for individual CLOs
Sale price (same month) 94.26 94.14 94.17 0.09*** [3.71]
Purchase price (same month) 97.80 97.78 97.85 −0.05*** [-6.47]
Sale price (anytime) 95.55 95.09 94.59 0.95*** [7.68]
Sale date Jan 4, 2014 Apr 15, 2014 Apr 25, 2014 -111*** [-13.29]
Loan rating at sale date 7.40 7.34 7.31 0.09*** [4.60]
Panel C: Results at manager level
Sale price (anytime) 95.64 95.28 95.05 0.59*** [4.39]
Sale date Feb 6, 2014 May 9, 2014 Apr 20, 2014 -73*** [-8.18]
Loan rating at sale date 7.44 7.42 7.33 0.11*** [5.23]
Panel D: Transaction size between $900,000 and $1,100,000
Sale price (anytime) 95.87 95.32 94.67 1.19*** [4.74]
Sale date Dec 25, 2013 Jun 1, 2014 May 13, 2014 -139*** [-6.69]
Loan rating at sale date 7.59 7.56 7.40 0.19*** [3.78]
31
Table 1.5: Analysis of different CLO subsamples split by turnover. This
table shows average CLO performance and transaction prices for different subsamples
of the entire CLO sample. At the beginning of quarter t, the entire CLO sample
is split into three portfolios based on their turnover in quarter t − 1. In Panel A,
the sample is split based on the active turnover measure constructed in Section 3.3.
Panel A reports average turnover, equity payments and collateral default rates for the
different portfolios. Panel B reports results for portfolios sorted on the non-active
turnover measure constructed in Section 3.3. In Panel C, the average active turnover
for the first four observed quarters are computed for each CLO and we split the entire
CLO sample into three portfolios based on their average active turnover in the first
year. IRR is the internal rate of return which is computed for the subset of closed
CLOs for which we have complete payment information. High - Low tests if there is a
significant difference between high and low turnover portfolios. Newey-West t-statistics
are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at a 1%, 5%, and 10%
level respectively. The sample period is January 2009 to December 2016.
High Medium Low High
Turnover Turnover Turnover - Low [t-stat]
Panel A: Results for active turnover
Turnovert 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.05*** [24.52]
Equityt 23.20 22.26 21.00 2.20** [2.27]
Defaultt 1.34 1.61 2.10 −0.76*** [−5.93]
Panel B: Results for non-active turnover
Turnovert 0.10 0.02 0.00 0.09*** [3.36]
Equityt 25.57 19.00 20.90 4.91 [0.83]
Defaultt 3.67 1.95 1.88 1.79** [2.40]
Panel C: Results for active turnover in the first 4 quarters
Active turnover 3.02 1.65 1.18 1.84 ∗ ∗∗ [9.74]
Equity payment 24.99 23.65 20.58 4.41 ∗ ∗∗ [4.08]
Percent default 1.12 1.44 2.37 −1.25 ∗ ∗∗ [−11.73]
IRR 0.14 0.11 0.02 −− −−
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Table 1.6: Higher active turnover predicts better transaction prices. This
table shows regressions of sale prices (first two columns) and purchase prices (last
two columns) regressed on the active turnover measure constructed in Section 3.3,
controlling for the time to maturity (TTMi,t) of the traded loan, the loan principal
(log(Principali,t), and the loan rating at the transaction date (Ratingi,t), as well as
several CLO and CLO collateral controls that are described in the caption of Table
1.2. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors, clustered at the issuer level, are re-
ported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at a 1%, 5%, and 10% level
respectively. The sample period is January 2009 to December 2016, including all USD
leveraged loan transactions executed by the CLOs from our filtered sample.
Sale price Purchase price
Intercept 43.374∗∗∗ 46.647∗∗∗ 64.696∗∗∗ 69.240∗∗∗
(3.096) (5.885) (1.605) (2.256)
TurnoverActivej,t 9.129
∗∗∗ 5.268∗∗ −7.380∗∗∗ −6.042∗∗∗
(2.367) (2.333) (1.167) (1.050)
TTMi,t 0.557
∗∗∗ 0.506∗∗∗ 0.298∗∗∗ 0.373∗∗∗
(0.146) (0.158) (0.054) (0.062)
log(Principalj,t) 0.429
∗∗∗ 0.438∗∗∗ 0.388∗∗∗ 0.405∗∗∗
(0.125) (0.135) (0.053) (0.056)
Ratingi,t 2.614
∗∗∗ 2.657∗∗∗ 0.720∗∗∗ 0.719∗∗∗
(0.241) (0.244) (0.068) (0.066)
log(Sizej,t) −0.291 −0.182∗
(0.325) (0.101)
Agej,t (years) 0.032 0.124
∗∗∗
(0.068) (0.028)
Reinvest dummy 1.236∗∗∗ −0.483∗∗∗
(0.380) (0.118)
Family size 0.615 2.124∗∗∗
(0.859) (0.467)
Equity share 2.700∗ 0.889
(1.544) (0.789)
Test breach dummy −2.323∗∗ 0.022
(0.941) (0.343)
Average TTM 0.256 −0.303∗∗∗
(0.286) (0.098)
Diversification 0.296 0.414
(0.517) (0.252)
Equity return (%) 0.012∗∗ −0.007∗∗
(0.005) (0.003)
Percent default 0.025 −0.237∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.035)
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Loan type FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 97,585 92,180 101,723 96,739
Adjusted R2 0.379 0.383 0.410 0.415
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Table 1.7: Higher active turnover predicts better CLO performance. This
table shows regressions of collateral default rates (first two columns) and annualized
equity returns (last two columns) regressed on the active turnover measure constructed
in Section 3.3 and controlling for the CLO and CLO collateral controls described in the
caption of Table 1.2. Newey-West standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***,
**, and * indicate significance at a 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. The sample
period is January 2009 to December 2016, including all CLOs from our filtered sample.
Perc Default Equity Return (%)
Intercept −3.73 −4.18 −17.45∗∗ −20.58∗∗
(2.52) (3.94) (7.61) (9.03)
TurnoverActivei,t −0.04∗∗∗ −0.02∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04)
log(Size) 0.18 0.32 1.05∗∗∗ 1.10∗∗
(0.12) (0.21) (0.39) (0.45)
Age (years) 0.06 0.08∗ 0.50∗∗∗ 0.33∗
(0.04) (0.05) (0.10) (0.20)
Reinvest dummy 0.07 −0.00 1.46∗∗∗ 1.12∗
(0.13) (0.07) (0.47) (0.62)
Family size −0.87∗ −0.65∗ −0.03 −1.49
(0.47) (0.37) (1.11) (1.15)
Equity share 0.04∗∗ 0.06∗∗ −0.17∗∗∗ −0.24∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.06)
Test breach dummy 2.24∗∗∗ −4.14∗∗∗
(0.82) (0.92)
Average TTM −0.15∗∗ 0.79
(0.07) (0.71)
Diversification −0.10 −6.27∗∗
(0.10) (3.17)
lagged percent default 0.79∗∗∗ 0.67∗∗∗
(0.14) (0.18)
lagged equity return 0.73∗∗∗ 0.64∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.06)
Time FE No Y es No Y es
Observations 8,214 8,151 7,740 7,653
Adjusted R2 0.50 0.57 0.41 0.45
34
9 Appendix: Characteristics of the Different CLO Portfolios
In this section, we investigate whether the difference in performance between high
turnover and low turnover CLOs can be related to other CLO characteristics. To that
end, we compare average CLO characteristics for high and low active turnover CLOs
in Table 1.8. As we can see from the table, the most active and least active CLOs are
comparable across most dimensions. In particular, there is no significant difference in
their original size, CCC bucket, senior or junior fees, family size, or number of loans
held in their portfolios. The only two characteristics that are significantly different are
equity share and age. On average, more active CLOs tend to have a smaller equity
share, indicating that they are using more leverage. However, the difference in equity
share between active and less active CLOs is not economically significant and below
0.005%. The more active CLOs are, on average, 14 months younger than less active
CLOs. We attribute this difference in CLO age to the lifecycle of a CLO. As explained
in Section 2, older CLOs are more likely to enter their redemption period, in which
they face tighter regulation on purchasing new loans.
Table 1.8: Analysis of different CLO subsamples split by turnover. This table
shows average CLO characteristics of different subsamples of the entire CLO sample
based on previous quarter turnover. At the beginning of quarter t, the entire CLO
sample is split into three portfolios based on their active turnover in quarter t−1. ***,
**, and * indicate significance at a 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. The sample
period is January 2009 to December 2016.
High Medium Low High
Turnover Turnover Turnover - Low [t-stat]
Original size 540.23 536.48 520.72 19.51 [1.44]
Equity share 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.00** [−2.02]
Age 44.31 50.26 59.10 −14.79*** [−2.99]
CCC bucket 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.00 [0.87]
Senior fee 17.67 17.34 17.54 0.13 [0.28]
Junior fee 34.50 32.65 34.36 0.14 [0.18]
CLO family 12.35 12.63 12.60 −0.25 [−0.56]
# Loans 385.06 408.91 376.23 8.83 [0.51]
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Chapter 2
Relationship Lending and Loan
Performance on the Secondary
Market
Abstract:
I show that loans with strong borrower-lender relationships (relationship loans) are
of higher quality than loans with weak borrower-lender relationship (non-relationship
loans). A one-year increase in the length of the relationship between the borrower and
the lender implies a 7% decrease in the odds of downgrade and a 15-19% increase in the
odds of upgrade. Furthermore, relationship loans trade at prices that are $1 (per $100
notional) higher than non-relationship loans, with the same Z-score. Finally, prices of
relationship loans are less volatile and closer to par value of the loan. I hypothesize
that the high-quality firm is unable to get competitive rates from outside banks and
therefore continues to borrow from the same bank.
I am grateful for valuable comments from Jens Dick-Nielsen, Bjo¨rn Imbierowicz, David Lando, and
Christian Skov Jensen. I gratefully acknowledge support from the FRIC Center for Financial Frictions
(grant no. DNRF102).
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1 Introduction
Empirical evidence suggests that firms benefit from long-term relationships with their
bank in terms of cheaper credit (Berger and Udell (1995) and Bharath, Dahiya, Saun-
ders, and Srinivasan (2011)) and easier access to credit (Petersen and Rajan (1994)).
Presumably, this is because banks become more informed about the firm’s business
over the course of the relationship, i.e., asymmetric information diminishes which al-
lows the relationship bank to charge high-quality borrowers a fair low interest rate.
Botsch and Vanasco (2017) use a proxy that captures firms’ creditworthiness but is
unobservable to the market and show that banks learn private information about firms
through repeated lending.
In this paper I show, using post-issuance loan performance measures, that borrow-
ers who repeatedly borrow from the same bank are of higher quality than borrowers
who switch between banks, even if the borrowers have the same publicly observable
quality in the form of credit rating or Z-score at loan issuance date. This is consistent
with the notion that banks learn private information about the firm over the course
of the relationship. To better understand this notion, consider the following. When a
relationship is formed between a bank and a borrower, the bank obtains some private
information about the borrower and becomes able to assess the true credit quality of
the borrower. Following Sharpe (1990), the relationship bank then offers lower interest
rates on future loans which outside banks cannot match. This implies that high-quality
firms keep borrowing from the same bank whereas lower quality firms might find it
optimal to switch bank.
Using a novel dataset of syndicated loan transactions I document that loans with
strong borrower-lender relationships (relationship loans) are of higher quality than
loans with weak borrower-lender relationships (non-relationship loans) after controlling
for the publicly observed quality of the loan at issuance date. I measure loan quality
ex-post issuance date on three dimensions: (1) relationship loans are less likely to get
downgraded and more likely to get upgraded, (2) a relationship loan trades at a higher
price on the secondary market than a non-relationship loan when the borrowers have
the same Z-score at loan issuance, and (3) secondary market prices of relationship
loans are less volatile and closer to par value.
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I contribute to the literature on relationship lending by providing evidence sug-
gesting that banks become more informed about private information of a firm through
repeated lending. This contribution is closely related to that of Botsch and Vanasco
(2017). However, our identification strategies differ greatly. Botsch and Vanasco (2017)
consider firm-level performance and rely on one unexpected shock to the economy. I
consider loan-level performance and I track this performance continuously through
time – not just around one event.
To the best of my knowledge, I am the first to look at loan performance in the
form of rating changes and transaction prices on the secondary market in the context of
relationship lending. Specifically, I consider syndicated loans, which are large corporate
loans where more than one entity acts as lenders. The lead arranging bank of a
syndicated loan keeps, on average, 27% of the loan notional on its own balance sheet,
implying that the borrower is monitored by the relationship bank although parts of the
loan are traded on the secondary market. The secondary market for syndicated loans
is an over-the-counter market and very illiquid, hence data is sparse. I use a dataset of
collateral holdings and collateral transactions of collateralized loan obligations (CLOs).
CLOs are structured finance products, where a CLO manager actively maintains a
portfolio of syndicated loans. CLOs are designed with the purpose of combining a
well-diversified portfolio of risky assets into one safe asset with relatively high return.
Therefore, CLOs invest in the riskiest segments of the syndicated loan market. This
makes this dataset tilted towards lower rated loans, which serves as a particularly
interesting sample for studying the question of loan performance.
My dataset is unique since I can track loans continuously from issuance until ma-
turity. The dataset includes monthly CLO collateral holdings which allow me to track
loans’ credit ratings on a monthly basis. Furthermore, the CLO manager is an active
manager, meaning that he buys and sells corporate loans on the secondary market,
which allows me to track loan prices. This is illustrated in Figure 2.1 and Figure
2.2. The figures plot transaction prices and credit ratings of four loans made to two
firms. Figure 2.1 is two loans issued to Constellation Brands on June 5, 2006. On
the issuance date, Constellation brands had regularly been borrowing money from the
same lead bank for 1,174 days, which means that Constellation Brands and the bank
had a strong relationship. Presumably, this means that the bank is very well informed
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about Constellation Brands’ credit risk and agrees to the loan because Constellation
Brands is a relatively safe borrower. From Figure 2.1 we see that credit ratings and
transaction prices of the loans dropped shortly after loan issuance but later recovered
to a level above the original. Figure 2.2 is two loans issued to Walter Energy on April 1,
2011. Walter Energy and the lead bank of the loan had not previously done any busi-
ness together, implying that the bank had limited private information about the credit
risk of Walter Energy. Evidently, Walter Energy’s loans experienced a persistent drop
in credit rating and transaction prices a couple of years after issuance before Walter
Energy finally filed for bankruptcy in July 2015. Earlier studies on loan performance
have only considered default rates and would merely have concluded that the Walter
Energy loans defaulted and that the Constellation Brands did not. My data allow me
to track a considerably more refined set of performance parameters. I can track both
upgrades and downgrades, also when they occur consecutively to the same loan. In
addition, I can track variation in loan prices on the secondary market over time.
The paper’s main finding, that relationship loans are of higher quality than non-
relationship loans, manifests itself in three separate findings. The first finding is that
relationship loans are less likely to get downgraded and more likely to get upgraded.
In a logistic regression setting, I find that the odds of getting downgraded decreases
with 7% and that the odds of getting upgraded increases with 15%-19% when the
relationship length between the borrower and the lender is increased by one year.
Next, I split the sample into 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 years after loan issuance and run a
categorical logistic regression to test the relationship effect on rating changes after
different horizons. I find that the effect becomes stronger the further we are from
loan issuance. Two years after loan issuance I find that a one-year increase in the
borrower-lender relationship increases the odds of getting upgraded and decreases the
odds of getting downgraded with 11%. Five years after loans issuance I find that a one-
year longer relationship implies a 34% decrease and increase in the odds of downgrade
and upgrade, respectively. The increasing relationship effect is consistent with rating
agencies gradually learning the true quality of the firm, which was known to the lender
already at loan issuance.
My second finding is that transaction prices of relationship loans are, on average,
$1 higher per $100 notional than transaction prices of non-relationship loans when
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the two borrowers had the same Z-score at issuance date. Furthermore, I find that
increasing the borrower-lender relationship by one year implies a relative price increase
of 3 cents per $100 notional every month the loan trades. These results on transaction
prices follow the results on rating changes. As relationship loans tend to be upgraded
and non-relationship loans tend to be downgraded, the price difference between the
two loan types increases, such that relationship loans trade at higher prices on the
secondary market and non-relationship loans trade at lower prices.
My third finding is that transaction prices of relationship loans are less volatile
than transaction prices of non-relationship loans. I find that increasing the borrower-
lender relationship by one year decreases the price volatility 0.15-0.20 corresponding
to 5% of the average volatility. Interest rates on syndicated loans are set such that
loans trade at par when the loan is issued, implying that the fair value of a loan equals
$100 at loan issuance as well as at loan maturity, provided that the borrower has
not defaulted on the debt. Loans in my sample pay variable interest rate which means
that fair value deviations from $100 during the lifespan of the loan arise due to changes
in the borrower’s credit risk. I measure the root-mean-squared-error (RMSE) of the
difference between the observed transaction prices and $100 and find that increasing the
borrower-lender relationship by one year decreases the RMSE with 0.28 corresponding
to 5% of the average RMSE.
While I am the first to use secondary market transactions, Drucker and Puri (2009)
consider secondary market quotes and find that loans traded on the secondary market
have more covenants. The string of literature most related to my paper is that of re-
lationship lending and firm performance. Bolton, Freixas, Gambacorta, and Mistrulli
(2016), Schafer (2016), and Calcagnini, Cole, Giombini, and Grandicelli (2018) study
small and medium size firms and find that relationship loans are less likely to default
and less likely to become delinquent than non-relationship loans. My paper contributes
to their findings by examining a different segment of the market – large corporations.
Furthermore, I do not examine defaults but rating changes. Rating changes are linked
to defaults but give a considerably finer indication of changes in the borrowers’ perfor-
mance. Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1990) show, in a Japanese sample, that firms
with a relationship bank sell more and invest more when in distress. Fok, Chang, and
Lee (2004) study a sample of Taiwan firms and find a negative relation between the
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number of domestic-bank relationships and firm performance, but a positive relation
between the number of foreign-bank relationships and firm performance. Botsch and
Vanasco (2017) show that banks charge lower rates to firms who outperform in the
future. Other papers have considered what the banks gain from maintaining relation-
ships with their clients. Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, and Srinivasan (2007) show that
banks are more likely to win subsequent loan business from borrowers with which they
have strong relationships. Another string of the literature argues that the private in-
formation associated with lending relationships provides the bank with a competitive
advantage, allowing the banks to extract excess rent from high-quality borrowers, see,
for example, Sharpe (1990), Petersen and Rajan (1995), Degryse and Ongena (2005),
and Schenone (2010).
2 The Syndicated Loan Market
Syndicated loans are large corporate loans where a group of lenders (called the syn-
dicate) come together to finance the loan. The syndicate is led by one or more lead
arranging banks. Before the syndication process starts the lead arranging bank con-
ducts due diligence on the borrower and sets up loan contracting terms. The lead
arranging bank then searches the market for other banks and institutional investors to
co-finance the loan while communicating the quality of the borrower to potential in-
vestors.1 After syndication, the lead bank is in charge of monitoring the borrower. The
lead arranging bank is the only bank that directly monitors the borrower, therefore I
only consider the lead arranging bank to have a relationship with the borrower.
The purpose of syndication is to diversify and diminish idiosyncratic credit risk
in the individual bank’s balance sheet. Nonetheless, Ivashina (2009) finds that the
lead arranging bank, on average, retains 27% of the loan notional on its own balance
sheet.2 This motivates the lead arranger to keep an eye on the borrower not only for
reputational reasons (of which Gopalan, Nanda, and Yerramilli (2011) highlights the
importance) but also to ensure his own investment.
A syndicated loan is structured as a loan package consisting of one or more facil-
1See Ivashina and Sun (2011) for a detailed description of the syndication procedure.
2Sufi (2007) finds that the lead arranging bank retains more when the borrower requires more
intense monitoring.
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ities. Each facility is considered as separate units with different features, terms, and
potentially different investors. For example, on June 5, 2006, Constellation Bands
(a liquor-producing firm) borrowed 3.5 billion dollars with the purpose of acquiring
Vincor International (wine company). The notional was split between three facilities:
Facility Notional Maturity
Term loan A 1.2 bill 5 years
Term loan B 1.8 bill 7 years
Revolving line of credit 500 mill 5 years
A total of 22 banks participated in the syndicate, of which all 22 banks invested in
the revolving line of credit, and 8 banks invested in the term A loan and in the term
B loan. The difference between term loans A and B is that term A loans are fully
amortized and term B loans are only partially amortized.
When two facilities of the same loan package have the same lead arranging bank
they will be categorized as having the same borrower-lender relationship. Even so, I
will consider each facility as a separate unit. First of all, the facilities are different
in terms of loan characteristics and in terms of performance after issuance. Second,
the nature of the loan performance data is such that often only one facility of a loan
package is observed at a time. Of the facilities in the final sample, 87% are part of a
package deal including two or more facilities, but in the regression analyses, 77% to
87% of observations are the only observations from a given package at a given time.
The data used in this study is a subset of facilities that are held by collateralized
loan obligations (CLOs). CLOs are structured finance products where the collateral
is risky syndicated loans commonly referred to as leveraged loans. CLOs primarily
invest in certain types of facilities, most common is term loan B, which is a loan
type specifically designed for institutional investors. Syndicated loans are traditionally
held by banks, but Ivashina and Sun (2011) document that since 2005, institutional
investors, and in particular CLOs, have held more than half of all newly issued term
B loans. This makes CLOs one of the largest investors in the syndicated loan market.
However, limiting the sample to facilities traded by CLOs creates a bias in the sample.
CLOs are prone to invest in high-yield loans because they carry a well-diversified
portfolio of corporate loans which diminishes idiosyncratic risk. Furthermore, term B
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loans often pay a higher interest rate spread than term A loans (150 basis points on
LIBOR versus 125 basis points on LIBOR in the Constellation Brands example). The
interest differential is induced by the longer maturity in term B loans, less amortization,
and an institutional loan premium (Lim, Minton, and Weisbach (2014)). It is therefore
likely that this study is tilted towards a riskier segment of the corporate loan market.
This will become clear when we look at summary statistics of the sample.
3 Data
I get information on loan performance from CreditFlux CLOi, a detailed database on
collateralized loan obligations (CLOs). CLOs are structured finance products where
the collateral is syndicated loans. From CreditFlux CLOi I collect information on
the CLOss collateral. The database provides monthly reports of collateral holdings
of a large sample of both European and US CLOs. These reports include credit rat-
ings of the syndicated loans held by CLOs which allow me to track the credit rating
of the loans after issuance. CLOs are active investors and they frequently update
their loan portfolio by buying and selling loans on the secondary market. CreditFlux
CLOi publishes these secondary market transaction as well, which I, in addition to the
credit ratings, use to measure loan performance after loan issuance. Fabozzi, Klingler,
Mølgaard, and Nielsen (2017) is, to the best of my knowledge, the only paper that has
used CreditFlux’s data on CLO collateral prior to this paper.
The advantage of this dataset is that it allows me to continuously track the loans
in my sample after issuance. This is illustrated in Figure 2.1 and in Figure 2.2. Figure
2.1 plots time series of transaction prices and credit ratings of term loan A and term
loan B mentioned in the Constellation Brands example in Section 2. The two loans
experience a rating downgrade and price drop around 2007-2008 but later recover to a
credit rating above what it was at issuance. Figure 2.2 plots prices and credit rating
of two loans made to Walter Energy in 2011. The loans are downgraded three rating
notches two years after issuance. This is followed by further downgrades and a steep
drop in prices, before Walter Energy finally files for bankruptcy in July 2015. These
two examples demonstrate the strength of the data used in this paper. Not only does
the data captures the final downgrades and upgrades of the loans, it also captures the
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intermediate variation in loan performance.
The loan performance sample is matched with DealScan where I collect issuance in-
formation on each loan including loan amount, coupon, maturity, and most importantly
I collect information on the relationship between the borrower and the lead arranger
of the loan. Construction of the relationship measure is described below. Merging
DealScan and CLOi is not a straightforward process. CLOi provides little informa-
tion on the loans, limited to the name of the borrower, loan type, and loan maturity.
Matching on these three items often leads to more than one match in DealScan. I only
accept a match between a CLOi loan and a DealScan loan when the loan is uniquely
identified in DealScan based on the CLOi characteristics. The majority of loans in
CLOi are either term loans, revolving lines of credit, or standby letters of credit issued
after 2002 and denominated in USD, EUR, or GBP. I limit the sample to loans with
these characteristics. The final sample has 3,785 unique loans made to 2,060 unique
borrowers.
Moody’s and S&P credit ratings are specified for a subsample of the loans. I use
Moody’s credit ratings in this paper, because they take the cost of default into account
while S&P ratings are merely based on the probability of default. However, all results
are robust to using S&P credit ratings instead of Moody’s credit ratings. For each loan,
I define a quarterly credit rating as the median credit rating observed in the quarter
and convert it to numerical values according to Table 2.1. Quarterly ratings are then
used to calculate rating changes after 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 years from loan issuance. Credit
ratings are only available to me at times where the loan is held by a CLO, thus credit
ratings are not available over the course of a full lifetime for all loans. I have Moody’s
credit rating at loan issuance on 1,948 of the loans, and for a subsample of these I
can determine subsequent rating changes. Figure 2.3 plots the relative distribution of
upgrades, no rating change, and downgrades one year after issuance, for loans issued
in each calendar year. Downgrades are more frequent in the first part of the sample
and upgrades are more frequent in the last part of the sample.
I collect monthly average prices of 2,632 loans from the CLO collateral transac-
tion sample. Transaction prices have been cleaned according to Fabozzi, Klingler,
Mølgaard, and Nielsen (2017). Figure 2.4 plots a time series of the cross-sectional
average of available monthly loan prices. A large drop in prices is seen around the
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peak of the financial crisis.
Finally, a subsample of the borrowers are in Compustat. I use the linkage table
provided by Chava and Roberts (2008) to merge with Compustat. The linkage table
was last updated in 2012, I extend it to 2017 by extending established links between
DealScan’s borrower IDs and Compustat’s GVKEYs. From Compustat, I find the size
of the borrowing firm measured as the firm’s total assets and compute Altman’s Z-score.
Altman (1968) shows that firms that file for bankruptcy share some commonalities
summarized by Altman’s Z-score:3
Z =0.012
Working capital
Total assets
+ 0.014
Retained earnings
Total assets
+ 0.006
Market value equity
Book value of total debt
+ 0.033
Earnings before interest and taxes
Total assets
+ 0.999
Sales
Total assets
(2.1)
Firms with high Altman’s Z-score are more likely to default than firms with low Alt-
man’s Z-score.
3.1 Descriptive Statistics
Panel A of Table 2.2 reports summary statistics of the loan sample. First, the table
reports three pieces of loan issuance information: loan amount, maturity in months,
and interest payment. Interest payment is only reported for loans that pay variable
interest rate linked to LIBOR, which is more than 80% of loans in the sample. The
remaining loans pay a spread on EURIBOR or a fixed interest rate. The loan amount
is, on average, 430 million dollars, the maturity of the loan is, on average, 6 years, and
the average spread on LIBOR is almost 400 basis points. Next, borrower characteristics
are reported for the subsample of loans that are matched with Compustat. The average
borrower has an Altman’s Z-score of 1.61 and assets worth $10 billion. Finally, loan
performance measures are reported. For loans where rating information is available at
the appropriate time, I find rating at loan issuance and compute rating changes after
1, 2, and 3 years. Finally, I compute the lifetime average price for each loan in the
3The formula for Altman’s Z-score using Compustat variables is
Z =1.2
ACT − LCT
AT
+ 1.4
RE
AT
+ 3.3
NI +XINT + TXT
AT
+ 0.6
CSHO · PRCCF
LT
+ 0.999
SALE
AT
.
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transactions sample. The average transaction price is $95.30 and the average credit
rating at issuance is 7.63 which corresponds to Moody’s credit rating B1. Loans in the
sample tend to be downgraded more than they are upgraded. Loans are, on average,
downgraded close to half a rating notch 3 years after issuance.
Panel B of Table 2.2 reports loan and borrower characteristics of all loans in
DealScan issued after 2002 that comply with the filters on currency and loan type.
This allows for a comparison of characteristics of loans in the sample to the full uni-
verse of similar loans in DealScan. The average loan amount of all DealScan loans is
268 mill USD, the average maturity is 5 years and the average spread on loans that
are linked to LIBOR is 276 basis points. Furthermore, the Altman’s Z-score of the
average borrowing firm is 2.56 and the average borrowing firm has total assets worth
$17 billion. This implies strong biases in the sample towards riskier loans issued by
riskier corporations. Loans in the merged sample are significantly larger than loans in
general, have longer maturities, and pay higher interest rates. Furthermore, borrowers
in the sample are smaller and have higher Altman’s Z-scores. This bias is expected
since CLOs prefer to hold high-yielding syndicated loans.
The risky loans, which are overrepresented in this sample, are naturally harder
to value (Diamond (1991)). This means that there is more private information to be
extrapolated for these loans and therefore stronger benefits to the bank from estab-
lishing and maintaining a relationship with the client. Therefore, this study might
find stronger results of relationship lending than a similar study focusing on less risky
syndicated loans would do. Furthermore, rating changes are relatively common in the
risky corporate loans which create more variation in the observations and therefore a
more powerful statistical test.
3.2 Lending Relationship Measures
I construct two different lending relationship measures. Both measures describe the
relationship between the borrower and the lead arranger of the loan. When a loan
has more than one lead arranger I use the relationship to the lead arranger with the
strongest relationship. The two relationship measures are:
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Relationship Length
Measures the number of years between the loan issuance date and the date the lead
arranger first facilitated a loan to the borrower. If the lead arranger and the borrower
stop collaborating temporarily, the relationship length is reset to zero. I define a stop
in collaboration when two conditions are met: (1) The lead arranger has not facilitated
a loan to the borrower in more than five years, and (2) The last loan facilitated by the
lead arranger matured more than 1 year prior to the start date of the new loan.
Relationship Intensity
Just before loan issuance, I look at the borrower’s outstanding loans. The measure
equals the total amount of outstanding loans with the same lead arranger relative to
the total amount of all outstanding loans.
Relationship length is a common way to measure lending relationships in the liter-
ature, used for instance by Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Berger and Udell (1995).
The measure is truncated for loans issued close to DealScan’s start date. However, this
is not an issue here since my sample starts in 2002 which is 15 years after DealScan’s
sample starts. Relationship intensity is similar to other relationship measures used in
the literature (see e.g. Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, and Srinivasan (2007), Bharath,
Dahiya, Saunders, and Srinivasan (2011), Schenone (2010)). The purpose of this mea-
sure is to capture the lead arranging bank’s investment in the borrower relative to
other banks’ investment. The original measure by Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, and
Srinivasan (2007) considers loans issued within the past five years. This includes short
maturity loans issued relatively long ago and excludes long maturity loans issued more
than five years ago even if they have not yet matured. In that sense, my measure is
more precise because I consider loans outstanding just before the issuance date of the
new loan. Relationship intensity is only defined if the borrower has outstanding syn-
dicated loans around the issuance date of the new loan. Relationship length is defined
for all loans and is therefore available for a larger sample than Relationship intensity.
The correlation between the two relationship measures is only 0.54.4 This high-
lights that the two metrics capture something different in the relationship between
4Excluding non-relationship loans, the correlation is only 0.08.
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the borrower and the lender. Relationship length captures that a bank becomes more
informed the longer it has done business with its client. However, the measure does
not take into account that the bank has more incentive to collect private information
if it is more invested in the firm. This dimension is then captured by the relationship
intensity, where a strong relationship means that the bank is heavily invested in the
firm relative to other banks. In most of the following tests, both of the relationship
measures will be considered, such that both dimensions of the relationship between
the borrower and the lender are captured.
4 Predictions on Loan Performance
Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1990) find that firms with strong bank relationships
perform better after a period of financial distress. This suggests that there is some-
thing special about firms that borrow money from the same bank repeatedly. They
are generally in better shape and are more capable to sustain financial turmoil. Pre-
sumably, this effect holds for loans as well, such that relationship loans are less likely
to default than non-relationship loans. In this section, I develop hypotheses on how
relationship and non-relationship loans differ in terms of credit ratings and when they
trade in the secondary market.
Sharpe (1990) and Rajan (1992) argue that it is optimal for high quality firms to
borrow from the same bank repeatedly but the same is not true for low-quality firms.
Sharpe puts it like this: “high quality firms are, in a sense, ’informationally captured’.”
This rationale stems from adverse selection. Outside banks cannot identify high quality
borrowers and therefore they cannot offer competitive rates to high quality firms. Low
quality firms are offered high interest rates by their relationship bank, matching how
risky they are, these interest rates the outside bank can match. This implies that high
quality firms borrow from the same bank repeatedly and that low quality firms borrow
from different banks. This is empirically supported by Botsch and Vanasco (2017)
who find that high quality firms receive lower interest rates as their bank acquires
information though repeated lending. Whereas low quality borrowers’ interest rates
do not change as their bank becomes more informed. High and low quality refer to the
true quality of the firm which differs from the public signal the outside banks observe.
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The public signal includes credit rating and accounting information which an out-
side bank can access relatively easily. The theory of Sharpe and Rajan implies that
amongst a group of firms with the same public signal, e.g., the same credit rating,
firms that repeatedly borrow from the same bank will be of higher quality than firms
that borrow from a non-relationship bank. After loan issuance new information will
reach the public, e.g., when annual reports are released. These events are likely to be
of good nature for high quality firms and of bad nature for low quality firms. If the
news are unexpected and provides sufficiently new information, the credit rating of the
firm’s outstanding loan may change. This leads to my first hypothesis on relationship
and non-relationship loan performance.
Hypothesis 1. Relationship loans are more likely to be upgraded and less likely to be
downgraded than non-relationship loans.
Lending-relationship in the syndicated loan market is special in the sense that
only the lead arranging bank is strictly monitoring the borrower. This means that
only the lead arranging bank has private information. Around loan issuance the lead
bank then seeks to convince the participating banks and institutional investors of what
private information it holds. If the lead bank is successful the loan is granted at the
appropriate interest rate chosen by the lead bank. The private information released
during the lead bank’s quest for co-investors is likely to spill out into the market
including other investors than those who participated in the initial loan deal, such
that when the loan is traded in the secondary market, market participants might be
aware that the borrower is of higher quality than what the public signal suggests.
Hypothesis 2. Relationship loans trade at higher prices on the secondary market than
non-relationship loans given that they had the same public available default probability
at loan issuance.
When the lead bank communicates with the rest of the market, it is likely that
not all of its private information is conveyed to the public. The release of new public
information can then move prices as well as credit ratings. Good news can raise prices
because the credit risk component of the price decreases and bad news can result in a
price decrease. If the true quality is higher than the relationship bank convinced the
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market, new information will generally be good and cause prices to increase. News
about borrowers with non-relationship loans are more likely to be negative as discussed
above. Such news will cause loan prices to drop. A drop in prices is likely to be
especially steep if the news reveal the firm to be close to default.
Hypothesis 3. Secondary market prices of relationship loans are likely to increase
over time relative to secondary market prices of non-relationship loans. Or, equiva-
lently, secondary market prices of non-relationship loans are likely to decrease over
time relative to secondary market transactions of relationship loans.
Many and large changes in prices create uncertainty which a risk-averse investor
dislikes. Everything else equal it is safe to assume that an investor prefers to hold
assets with low volatility.
When new information is revealed, which changes the public’s presumption of a
borrower’s credit risk, prices will move and volatility increase. Good news that result
in a negative shock to the borrower’s credit risk decreases the rate at which cash flows
of the borrower’s outstanding loans are discounted. Consequently, loan prices will
raise. The loans in my sample are typically callable, implying that if the news are
good enough, the firm will call the loan and negotiate a new loan with better terms.
The positive shock to prices is therefore bounded upwards. Bad news resulting in a
positive shock to the borrower’s credit risk increases the discount rate and prices drop.
The drop in prices is bounded below by zero. However, the lower bound leaves much
more room for price changes than the upper bound.
In the limit prices can, therefore, drop to zero. Hence, bad news, which is assumed
to be more common for non-relationship loans, can create more price volatility than
good news.
Continuing on the notion that the market is more informed about the true fun-
damental value of relationship loans implies that news on borrowers with relationship
loans are less surprising than news on borrowers with non-relationship loans. This
would cause secondary market prices of non-relationship loans to react more to news
events than secondary market prices of relationship loans. Furthermore, if the market
is well informed about the true fundamental value of an asset, prices of this asset will
deviate less from par value.
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Hypothesis 4. Secondary market prices of relationship loans are less volatile and
closer to par value than secondary market prices of non-relationship loans.
The hypotheses are tested in the following section.
5 Empirical Analysis
5.1 Unconditional Results
This section compares firm characteristics, loan characteristics, and loan performance
of relationship and non-relationship loans, respectively. Loans are characterized as
relationship loans if the relationship length of the loan is positive and non-relationship
loans if the relationship length of the loan is zero. The average relationship length
of relationship loans is 3.5 years and the average relationship intensity of relationship
loans is 0.78. Relationship length and relationship intensity are defined in Section 3.2.
Table 2.3 reports for different characteristics the unconditional mean for relation-
ship loans and the unconditional mean for non-relationship loan. Significance of the
difference between relationship and non-relationship loans is tested with standard er-
rors clustered at the borrower level. First, firm characteristics of relationship and
non-relationship borrowers are compared. I find no difference in firm size or firm risk,
measured as the Altman Z-score of the firm. In terms of firm age, I find that firms
which obtain relationship loans are 19 years on average and that firms which obtain
non-relationship loans are 16.7 years on average. The difference of 2.3 years is sig-
nificant. However, none of the firms in the sample are what we would characterize
as young firms, implying that age will not drive differences between relationship and
non-relationship loans.
Next, the table compares loan characteristics. All loan characteristics are sig-
nificantly different for the two loan types. Relationship loans are 70% larger than
non-relationship loans, they have slightly shorter maturity, and pay 40 basis points
less in interest rate. These indicative results are in line with the existing literature
that has found relationship loans to be larger and cheaper. Furthermore, I find the
average numerical rating at issuance of relationship loans to be 7.82 corresponding to
Moody’s credit rating B1. The average numerical rating of non-relationship loans is
7.42 corresponding to B2. The difference of 0.4 rating notch is significantly greater
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than zero which means that relationship loans are, on average, better rated at loan
issuance than non-relationship loans.
Next Table 2.3 compares post-issuance performance measures of relationship loans
and non-relationship loans which is the focus of this study. I find that all loans are
more likely to be downgraded than upgraded, but, in line with Hypothesis 1, non-
relationship loans are significantly more often downgraded than relationship loans,
this holds both 1, 2, and 3 years after issuance. Finally, I compare prices of rela-
tionship loans and non-relationship loans. For each loan, I compute the average of
available monthly prices and compare the unconditional mean for relationship and
non-relationship loans. Relationship loans trade at a price that, on average, is $1.78
per $100 notional higher than non-relationship loans. This price difference is significant
at the 1% confidence level. Furthermore, I compute the volatility in monthly prices for
each loan and find that prices of relationship loans are significantly less volatile than
prices of non-relationship loans.
5.2 Relationship Lending and Loan Contract Terms
This section focuses on loan terms of relationship loans and non-relationship loans. The
previous literature has found that loans with stronger bank-borrower relationships are
bigger (easier access to credit) and pay lower interest rate spread (cheaper credit) see
for instance Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, and Srinivasan (2011) and Berger and Udell
(1995). The objective of this analysis is to see if the same is true in the smaller sample
of relative risky loans considered in this study. I focus on the cost of credit. The full
sample contains loans with different interest payment structures. In this analysis, I
will only look at the 86% of the loans that pay interest rate spread linked to LIBOR.
I test if borrowers with similar credit risk but different relationships with their credit
provider pay different interest rate spreads on their loans, by regressing interest rate
spreads on relationship measures, borrower characteristics, and loan characteristics:
ri,b,τ = βRelationshipb,τ +BorrowerControlb,τ +LoanControlsi,b,τ +δy+εi,b,τ , (2.2)
where ri,b,τ is the interest rate spread over LIBOR of loan i, with borrower b, issued
at date τ . I use the two measures of lending relationship: Relationship length and
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Relationship intensity which are unique to borrower b at loan issuance date τ . Borrower
controls include log of total assets and the firm’s Z-score. Loan controls consist of
dummies indicating if the loan is secured or not and the type of the loan (term loan,
revolving line of credit, standby letter of credit). Finally, year fixed effects are included.
Results of regression (2.2) are reported in the first two columns of Table 2.4. The
results show that borrowers with strong relationships obtain significantly lower in-
terest rate spreads. A one year longer relationship implies a 5-6 basis points lower
spread. Furthermore, increasing the relationship intensity from 0% to 100% decreases
the interest rate spread by 37 basis points. As expected I find that large borrowers
and borrowers with high Altman’s Z-score pay lower interest rates. Surprisingly, se-
cured loans are associated with higher interest payments. Very few loans are listed
as unsecured and in many observations, the secured field is left empty, which can ex-
plain this inconsistency in the result. Another explanation can be correlation between
loans being unsecured and having strong lending relationships, which Bharath, Dahiya,
Saunders, and Srinivasan (2011) find in their sample. To rule out this explanation I
run the analysis again excluding dummies for secured and unsecured. These results are
in the last two columns of Table 2.4. Coefficients on the relationship measures remain
unchanged, refuting that the relationship effect is dependent on the secured/unsecured
status of the loans.
The results of Table 2.4 are in line with the previous literature and show that bank
relationships have real effects to the borrowers, also in the relatively small sample con-
sidered in this study. Specifically, borrowers with strong bank-relationships pay up to
37 basis points less in interest rate. This difference is both economically and statis-
tically significant. The following sections look at the difference in post-issuance per-
formance of relationship loan and non-relationship loans. This helps us to understand
why banks charge lower rates from clients with which they have strong relationships.
5.3 Relationship Lending and Loan Credit Ratings
This is the first of two sections where I investigate the post-issuance performance of
relationship and non-relationship loans. Earlier studies have focused on differences in
relationship loans and non-relationship loan at issuance, with a few exceptions where
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loan default rates are considered (DeYoung, Glennon, and Nigro (2008), Jimenez and
Saurina (2004)). I am the first to look at the dynamic loan performance. I measure
the loan performance on two parameters: credit ratings and transaction prices. This
section investigates credit rating changes of relationship loans and non-relationship
loans. Credit ratings are ultimately a means of measuring default probability and
costs associated with defaults, which makes this analysis similar to studies that look
at loan defaults. However, rating changes can go both up and down and be more or
less radical, which allow me to study broader aspects of the credit quality of the loan
than a simple defaulted or non-defaulted dummy.
Figure 2.5 shows that the relative issuance of relationship loans to non-relationship
loans is much higher in the years before the financial crisis. This is likely to create
a bias in the sample. Not only do we observe that downgrades were more frequent
during the financial crisis but from Figure 2.3 we know that downgrades are also more
common in the years preceding the crisis and that upgrades are more common after
2012. This suggests that we will observe more downgrades and fewer upgrades in non-
relationship loans simply because they are over-represented in the sample in periods
where downgrades are more common and upgrades less common. This highlights the
importance of including time fixed effects in the formal test.
To better understand what happens in the different periods of the sample, I com-
pute the percentage of relationship and non-relationship loans downgraded and up-
graded 1 year after issuance in 2005-2008 (many downgrades), 2009-2012 (quiet pe-
riod), and 2013-2016 (many upgrades) respectively. Figure 6 (a) shows the issuance
of relationship and non-relationship loans, where 1-year rating change information is
available, in the three periods. Non-relationship loans are overrepresented in the first
period, where downgrades are more frequent, and relationship loans are overrepre-
sented in the other two periods, where upgrades are more frequent. Next, Figure 6
(b) plots the percentage of loans downgraded 1 year after issuance, for loans issued
in each of the three periods. In the first two periods, there is not much difference in
the percentage of downgrades for relationship loan and non-relationship loans. In the
last period, the downgrade percentage is considerably higher for non-relationship loans
than relationship loans. Finally, Figure 6 (c) plots the percentage of loans upgraded
1 year after issuance. For the first period there is not much difference but in the last
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two periods upgrades are considerably more common for relationship loans than for
non-relationship loans. This suggests that even when time-varying market conditions
are controlled for, non-relationship loans are more likely to be downgraded and less
likely to be upgraded than relationship loans.
I now move to the formal test of the effect of lending relationship on loan rating
changes. First, I test the effect of relationship on the probability of getting downgraded
and the probability of getting upgraded separately in a logistic regression setup:
logit(pi,b,τ,t) = βRelationshipb,τ+LoanControlsi,b,τ,t+BorrowerControlsb,τ+δyq+εi,b,τ,t,
(2.3)
where pi,b,τ,t is the modeled probability of downgrade/upgrade of loan i, t years
after issuance and where the loan is issued at date τ to borrower b. Relationshipb,τ is
the relationship between the borrower and lead bank at the time the loan is issued. I
use two measures of lending relationship: relationship length and relationship intensity.
Loan controls include a dummy if the loan is secured or unsecured, the age of the loan
measured as years since issuance, and dummies for loan type.5 Borrower controls
include the logarithm of the size of the firm and the firm’s Z-score at the time the
loan was issued. Finally, I include year-quarter fixed effects to pick up variation in the
propensity of downgrades and upgrades over time.
Table 2.5 shows results of the logistic regression in equation (2.3). Specification (1)
to (4) models the probability of getting downgraded and specification (5) to (8) mod-
els the probability of getting upgraded. Specification (1), (2), (5), and (6) excludes
borrower controls, but the credit risk of the borrower is still controlled for to some
extent since the credit rating of the loans at issuance is implicitly included. For both
relationship measures, I find that strong relationships are associated with lower proba-
bility of getting downgraded and increased probability of getting upgraded. Increasing
the relationship length by one year decreases the odds of getting downgraded with 7%
and increases the odds of getting upgraded with 14%. Specification (3), (4), (7), and
(8) include borrower controls. This causes the sample size to decrease significantly
since links to Compustat are only established for a subset of the borrowing firms. The
coefficient on relationship becomes insignificant on the probability of downgrades, but,
5Loan types include term loan, revolver, and standby letter of credit.
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for the probability of upgrade, the relationship remains significant and the coefficient
even increases in size. Increasing the relationship length by one year increases the
odds of getting upgraded with 17% in this specification. The coefficient on loan age
is positive for both upgrades and downgrades, naturally, since longer time allows for
the credit risk of the borrower to change and therefore we observe more upgrades and
more downgrades. The coefficient on Altman’s Z-score is positive on the probability of
upgrade and significantly negative on downgrades, implying that better-shaped firms,
within the same rating group, are less likely to get downgraded.
I now test the relationship effect on rating changes 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 years after
issuance separately.6 This setting allows us to investigate the effect of relationships
on the term structure of rating changes. For the purpose of this test, upgrades and
downgrades are combined into an ordered logistic regression with three levels: 1 =
downgrade, 2 = no rating change, and 3 = upgrade. Upgrade is the highest cate-
gory meaning that positive coefficients imply higher probability of upgrade and lower
probability of downgrades. Furthermore, borrower controls are excluded. Results are
reported in Table 2.6. The first column is rating changes 1 year after issuance, the
second column is rating changes two years after issuance continuing to column five
which is rating changes five years after issuance. Unsecured and secured dummies are
excluded in column five because all loans in this sample are secured. The coefficient
on relationship is positive for all five specifications and significant in four out of the
five. The size of the coefficient is increasing in years since issuance. A one-year longer
relationship between the borrower and lender increases the odds of getting upgraded
and decreases the odds of getting downgraded with 11% two years after loan issuance.
Five years after loan issuance the effect of lending relationship has gone up such that a
one-year longer relationship increases the odds of getting upgraded and decreases the
odds of getting downgraded with 34%. That is, the effect of the loan’s relationship
status becomes stronger the further we are from the issuance date.
Overall, the results of Table 2.5 and Table 2.6 tell us that loans with strong
borrower-lender relationships are less likely to be downgraded and more likely to be
6The logistic regression in Table 2.5 includes several observations of the same loan. Hence, we can
be concerned that correlation in the observations is driving the result. Splitting the sample in years
since issuance ensures that only one observation per loan is included in each regression, eliminating
such concerns.
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upgraded as expected in Hypothesis 1. Furthermore, the effect of relationship becomes
stronger the further we are from issuance date.
5.4 Relationship Lending and Secondary Market Transactions
This section examines the effect of lending relationship on transaction prices when
loans are traded on the secondary market. This test serves two purposes. First, it
assesses the effects caused by the difference in rating changes of relationship and non-
relationship loans when the loan is sold before maturity on the secondary market.
Rating changes do not affect the loan’s cash flows as long as the borrower does not
default on his or her debt. It is therefore not clear that investors should care about
rating changes. However, investors might need to sell the loan before maturity for
liquidity needs. In this case, a rating change is likely to affect the price of the loan and
therefore the cash flow the investor receives. Second, prices are available for a larger
set of loans than rating changes, thus this analysis serves as an alternative test of the
effect of lending relationship on loan performance.
I run several tests on the relationship effect on transaction prices. First, I examine
the effect of relationship on the level of prices, then I look at changes in prices, and
finally, I consider dispersion in transaction prices. As explained in Section 4, I expect
that prices of relationship loans are higher on average, increasing in time relative to
non-relationship loans, and less volatile.
As an initial motivation, I plot the unconditional mean of transaction prices for
loans issued with different relationship lengths in Figure 2.7. There is a clear positive
linear relation between the two. I also plot the unconditional volatility of transaction
prices for loans issued with different relationship lengths in Figure 2.8 and find a clear
negative linear relation between volatility and relationship length. This supports the
hypothesis that loans with strong relationships trade at higher prices on the secondary
market and have less disperse transaction prices.
To test the relationship effect on the price level, I regress transaction prices on the
relationship of the loan and on traditional credit characteristics, furthermore, I include
year-month fixed effects to capture moving market conditions including the large drop
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in prices around the financial crises:
Pi,b,τ,t = βRelationshipi,b,τ +LoanControlsi,b,τ +BorrowerControlsb,τ +δym+εi,b,τ,t.
(2.4)
Pi,b,τ,t is the average transaction price in month t of loan i, where loan i is issued to
borrower b at time τ . Controls at the borrower level include log of the borrower’s
total assets and the borrower’s Altman’s Z-score at the time the loan was issued. On
the loan level controls include secured/unsecured dummies, loan type dummies, and
currency dummies.
Results of regression (2.4) are in the first two columns of Table 2.7. The coefficient
on both relationship measures is positive and it is significant on Relationship intensity.
That is, the secondary market price of loan A will be $1 (per $100 notional) higher
than the secondary market price of loan B if the two loans are equally risky at issuance,
but loan A has Relationship intensity of 100% and loan B has Relationship intensity
of 0%.
This result is somewhat surprising. The price of a loan is constructed as the sum of
discounted cash flows. Cash flows consist of interest payments and a final repayment of
the principal. In Section 5.2 I document that relationship loans are issued with lower
interest rate spreads than non-relationship loans. We would then expect that, if a
relationship and a non-relationship loan are equally risky, i.e., have the same discount
rate, then the relationship loan should have a lower price, given that it pays a lower
interest rate spread. However, this is not the case, which means that the market adjusts
the discount rate of relationship loans downwards relative to non-relationship loans,
i.e., realizations reveal the relationship loans to be safer than non-relationship loans.
For completeness, I run regressions including the interest rate spread and report results
in column (3) and (4) of Table 2.7. Interest rate spread is found to be insignificant and
the coefficients on other variables do not change. This suggests that interest payments
do not affect the price otherwise than what is captured by the at issuance credit risk
of the loan.
Next, I look at changes in transaction prices. For this purpose I regress transaction
price in month t, of loan i, on relationship measure and on the transaction price the
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last month the loan traded. Furthermore I include year-month fixed effects:
Pi,b,τ,t = βRelationshipi,b,τ + δPi,b,τ,t−1 + fym + εi,b,τ,t. (2.5)
Observations, where the loan did not trade within the past year, are excluded.7 Bor-
rower and loan controls are excluded since the credit risk of the loan is included in
the lagged transaction price. Results of regression (2.5) are in the final two columns
of Table 2.7. The coefficients on Relationship length and Relationship intensity are
both positive and the coefficient on Relationship length is significant. This implies
that relationship loans are less likely to decrease in price and more likely to increase in
price relative to non-relationship loans. Specifically, increasing the relationship length
by one year implies a relatively higher price increase of 3 cents (per $100 notional)
every month the loan trade.
The results of Table 2.7 suggest that, after issuance, the market learns that re-
lationship loans are safer than non-relationship loans, that were otherwise considered
equally risky at issuance. This is illustrated by the fact that prices of relationship loans
go up relative to prices of non-relationship loan trading in the same month. Further-
more, the realization of the improved credit quality of relationship loans implies that
investors of relationship loans earn $1 more, per $100 notional, when they sell loans
prematurely than investors of non-relationship loans.
After having shown that expected prices of relationship loans are higher than ex-
pected prices of, at issuance, equally risky non-relationship loans I move on to examine
the dispersion of transaction prices. When dispersion in prices of a particular loan is
high, it means that an investor of this loan is uncertain of what his gain will be when
he sells the loan. I construct three measures of price dispersion for each loan where I
have at least 6 monthly price observations.
First, I compute the raw sample standard deviation of the monthly prices for each
loan
Raw volatilityi = σˆi =
√√√√ 1
Ni − 1
∑
j∈{1,...,Ni}
(Pi,tj − P¯i)2, (2.6)
7Results are robust to excluding observations where the loan did not trade within the past 6 months
or the past quarter as well.
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where Pi,t is the price of loan i observed in month t, Ni is the number of observation of
loan i, and P¯i is the average price of loan i. The volatility estimate in (2.6) assumes that
all Pi,t’s have the same distribution. This assumption is potentially inaccurate since
price observations are unevenly spaced. A simple assumption on the price distribution
is
Pi,tj ∼ N
(
Pi,tj−1 , σ
2
i (tj − tj−1)
)
. (2.7)
The maximum likelihood estimator of σi in (2.7), and my second dispersion measure,
is
Adj. volatilityi = σ˜i =
√√√√ 1
Ni − 1
∑
j∈{2,...,Ni}
(Pi,tj − Pi,tj−1)2
tj − tj−1 . (2.8)
The average distance between two consecutive prices in my sample is about two months
indicating that the raw volatility measure resembles a two-month price volatility. The
adjusted volatility is, by definition, a monthly volatility measure.
The fair value of a loan equals $100 at loan issuance as well as just before loan
maturity, provided that the borrower has not defaulted. All loans in this analysis pay
variable interest rates, thus price deviations from $100 over the course of the lifetime of
the loan are linked to the borrower’s credit risk. A way to measure price dispersion is,
therefore, the price deviation from $100. My third and final price dispersion measure
is the root-mean-squared-error (RMSE) of the price deviation from $100:
RMSEi =
√√√√ 1
Ni
∑
j∈{1,...,Ni}
(Pi,tj − $100). (2.9)
I regress each dispersion measure on the length of the relationship between the
borrower and lender at loan issuance. Price volatility tends to be high for risky assets,
hence the borrower’s Z-score at loan issuance is included. Furthermore, loans issued
before the credit crisis of 2007-2008 are more likely to experience a large price drop
and consequently high dispersion. Therefore, I include a dummy equal to one for loans
issued before July 2007.
dispersioni = α+ βRelationshipi,b,τ +BorrowerControlsb,τ +D(PreCrisis)i + εi
(2.10)
61
Table 2.8 reports results of regression (2.10). All specifications demonstrate that prices
of loans with longer relationships have lower dispersion, also when the borrower’s credit
risk at loan issuance is controlled for. Increasing the borrower-lender relationship by
one year decreases the volatility with 0.15-0.20 (median volatility = 1.52), decreases the
adjusted volatility with 0.08-0.09 (median adjusted volatility = 1.11), and decreases
the RMSE with 0.28 (median RMSE = 1.90). That is, if the relationship length of
a median adjusted volatility loan is increased by one year the adjusted volatility will
decrease from 1.11 to 1.03. This is a relatively large decrease in volatility.
Table 2.8’s takeaway is that prices of relationship loans are more stable than prices
of non-relationship loans. This implies that investors of relationship loans can sell the
loans at prices that are both higher in expectation and less volatile than investors of
non-relationship loans.
6 Conclusion
This paper examines post-issuance performance of loans, a topic which is relatively
unexplored in the relationship lending literature. Using a novel dataset of collateral
holdings and collateral transaction of collateralized loan obligation (CLOs) I collect
detailed loan performance measures including rating changes and secondary market
transaction prices.
The paper has three main findings all supporting the hypothesis that a strong
borrower-lender relationship provides the bank with valuable private information on
the borrower’s credit quality. First, I show that loans with stronger borrower-lender
relationship are less likely to be downgraded and more likely to be upgraded. The
effect is stronger the further away we are from loan issuance. Second, relationship
loans trade at higher prices on the secondary market than non-relationship loans.
Finally, transaction prices of loans with longer borrower-lender relationship are less
volatile and deviate less from the principal value.
My results highlight that investors of relationship loans gain compared to investors
of non-relationship loans when they sell loans on the secondary market. Investors of
relationship loans earn more in expectation when the loans are sold before maturity
than investors of non-relationship loans, given that the loans were view equally risky
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at loan issuance. Furthermore, their investment is less risky as prices of relationship
loans are less volatile.
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Figure 2.1: Price and credit rating development of two loans made to Con-
stellation Brands on June 5, 2006. This figure shows the performance of two
loans made to Constellation Brands on June 5, 2006. Figure (a) plots a times series
of monthly average transaction price and Figure (b) plots quarterly Moody’s credit
ratings. The two loans are Term Loan A maturing on June 5, 2011 (red circles) and
Term Loan B maturing on June 5, 2013 (black line).
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(b) Credit ratings
Figure 2.2: Price and credit rating development of two loans made to Walter
Energy, Inc. on April 1, 2011. This figure shows the performance of two loans
made to Walter Energy on April 1, 2011. Figure (a) plots a times series of monthly
average transaction price and Figure (b) plots quarterly Moody’s credit ratings. The
two loans are Term Loan A maturing on April 1, 2016 (red circles) and Term Loan B
maturing on April 1, 2018 (black line).
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Figure 2.3: Distribution of One-year rating changes. The figure shows the ratio
of loans, issued in each calendar year, that are downgraded (in dark), has not changed
rating (in grey), and upgraded (in light) one year after issuance.
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Figure 2.4: Monthly average loan prices. Each month I compute the average
monthly transaction price of all loans in the sample that are traded in the given
month.
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Figure 2.5: Issuance of relationship and non-relationship loans. The figure
shows the number of non-relationship loans and the number of relationship loans issued
each calendar year. A loan is classified as a relationship loan if the lead arranging bank
of the loan has lent money to the borrower within the past five years, or if the lead
arranging bank’s previous loan to the borrower matured less than one year prior to
the start date of the current loan.
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Figure 2.6: Issuance and percentage downgraded of relationship and non-
relationship loans by period. Figure (a) plots the number of newly issued rela-
tionship and non-relationship loans with one-year rating changes available. Loans are
classified as relationship loans if the lead arranging bank of the loan has lent money
to the borrower within the past five years or if the last loan from the lead arranging
bank to the borrower matured less than one year prior to the start date of the current
loan. The sample is split into three periods, loans issued in 2005-2008, loans issued
in 2009-2012, and loans issued in 2013-2016. Figure (b) plots the percentage of rela-
tionship and non-relationship loans downgraded 1 year after issuance in each issuance
period and Figure (b) plots the percentage of relationship and non-relationship loans
upgraded 1 year after issuance in each issuance period.
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Figure 2.7: Transaction prices of loans with different relationship lengths. I
group loans by relationship length in buckets from 0 to 12 years. The figure shows the
average transaction price in each bucket.
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Figure 2.8: Adjusted volatilities of loans with different relationship lengths. I
group loans by relationship length in buckets from 0 to 12 years. I compute the adjusted
volatility defined in equation 2.8 for loans with at least 6 monthly price observations.
The figure shows the average adjusted volatility of loans in each relationship length
bucket.
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Table 2.1: Moody’s credit ratings converted to numerical values. This table
shows how Moody’s credit ratings are converted to numerical values.
Investment Grade Speculative Grade
Credit rating Numerical value Credit rating Numerical value
Aaa 21 Ba1 11
Aa1 20 Ba2 10
Aa2 19 Ba3 9
Aa3 18 B1 8
A1 17 B2 7
A2 16 B3 6
A3 15 Caa1 5
Baa1 14 Caa2 4
Baa2 13 Caa3 3
Baa3 12 Ca 2
C 1
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Table 2.2: Summary statistics of loans in the sample. This table reports mean,
standard deviation, 10% quantile, median, 90% quantile, and number of observations
of different loan characteristics. Panel A reports information on the sample of loans
that are matched with Creditflux CLOi. First, information on loan amount, maturity,
and spread on LIBOR (for loans that pay a variable interest rate linked to LIBOR) are
reported. These items are all obtained from DealScan. For loans where the borrower
is identified in Compustat, the size of the borrowing firm in the form of total assets
and the borrowing firm’s Altman’s Z-score is reported. Finally, performance measure
of the loans are reported. Specifically, rating at issuance, rating change after 1, 2, and
3 years, and average transaction price. Panel B reports information on all loans in
DealScan issued after 2002 that are of the same type (term loan, revolver, standby
letter of credit) and same currency (USD, EUR, GBP) as loans in the merged sample.
This panel includes loan characteristics and borrower characteristics.
Panel A: Loans in merged sample
mean sd 10% 50% 90% # obs
Loan amount (mill $) 430.32 524.94 58.74 250.00 1000.00 3785
Maturity (months) 72.36 15.23 58.00 72.00 84.00 3785
Spread on LIBOR (bps) 396.30 174.62 200.00 375.00 625.00 3426
Altman’s Z-score 1.61 1.47 0.21 1.53 3.20 781
Firm size (bill $) 10252.58 36400.14 617.28 3047.00 19605.80 1057
Loan rating at issuance 7.62 1.54 6.00 7.00 10.00 1952
1 year rating change 0.02 0.82 -0.60 0.00 1.00 1349
2 year rating change -0.20 1.34 -2.00 0.00 1.00 842
3 year rating change -0.44 1.69 -2.00 0.00 1.00 501
Price 95.30 9.11 86.79 98.89 100.23 2632
Panel B: All DealScan Loans
mean sd 10% 50% 90% # obs
Loan amount (mill $) 268.36 470.37 13.00 100.00 672.00 126727
Maturity (months) 60.55 37.87 24.00 60.00 84.00 126856
Spread on LIBOR (bps) 276.00 172.62 90.00 250.00 500.00 81929
Altman’s Z-score 2.56 2.25 0.48 2.20 5.21 21478
Firm size (bill $) 17169.15 55759.47 217.69 2325.46 30283.00 29201
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Table 2.3: Relationship vs. non-relationship loans. This table compares the
mean of characteristics of relationship and non-relationship loans. A loan is classified
as a relationship loan if the lender has borrowed money from the same lead arranger
within the past 5 years, or if a loan from the same lead arranger matured less than 1 year
ago. Difference is the mean of relationship loans minus the mean of non-relationship
loans. Standard errors are clustered at the borrower level, * is 10%, ** is 5%, and ***
is 1% significance.
Relationship loans Non-relationship loans Difference [t-stat]
Relationship Length 3.52 0
Relationship Intensity 0.78 0
Firm characteristics
Firm size (bill $) 11072.71 8854.43 2218.28 1.40
Age (years) 19.04 16.71 2.32∗∗ 2.55
Z-score 1.60 1.64 −0.04 -0.32
Loan characteristics
Loan size (mill $) 549.82 321.26 228.56∗∗∗ 10.09
Maturity (months) 71.10 73.52 −2.42∗∗∗ -4.03
Coupon (LIBOR) 375.28 415.40 −40.12∗∗∗ -5.99
Loan rating at issuance 7.82 7.42 0.40∗∗∗ 5.09
Post issuance performance
1 year rating change 0.06 -0.03 0.09∗ 1.90
2 year rating change -0.08 -0.33 0.25∗∗ 2.49
3 year rating change -0.27 -0.64 0.37∗∗ 2.21
Average price 96.30 94.52 1.78∗∗∗ 4.66
Price volatility 3.12 4.22 −1.10∗∗∗ -4.09
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Table 2.4: Relationship loans have lower interest rates. This table reports
results from a linear regression of the interest rate spread on relationship measure
and credit controls. Two measures of lending relationship are included: Relationship
length and Relationship intensity. Borrower firm controls include Altman’s Z-score
and firm size at the time the loan is issued. At the loan level, dummies are included
for secured/unsecured loans and loan type. The sample consists of loans (term loans,
revolving loans, and standby letter of credits) that are issued after 2002 in USD, EUR,
or GBP. Furthermore, the borrower must be matched in Compustat and the loan must
pay a variable interest rate linked to LIBOR. Standard errors are clustered at the firm
level and displayed in parentheses.
Dependent variable:
Interest Rate over LIBOR (bps)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Relationship length −5.708∗∗∗ −5.626∗∗∗
(1.654) (1.710)
Relationship intensity −36.804∗∗ −37.261∗∗
(14.784) (14.923)
Z-score −16.192∗∗∗ −17.014∗∗∗ −16.915∗∗∗ −17.532∗∗∗
(4.524) (4.727) (4.601) (4.844)
log(Total assets) −25.970∗∗∗ −23.689∗∗∗ −29.071∗∗∗ −27.530∗∗∗
(4.465) (4.226) (4.529) (4.359)
Unsecured −41.743 −34.056
(27.766) (27.922)
Secured 41.521∗ 51.499∗∗
(21.569) (22.124)
Revolving line of credit −18.713 −19.580 −23.658∗ −23.728∗
(13.120) (13.443) (13.423) (13.932)
Standby letter of credit −18.512 −18.908 −17.150 −17.720
(16.344) (15.962) (16.757) (15.775)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 826 728 826 728
R2 0.315 0.317 0.301 0.297
Adjusted R2 0.297 0.297 0.284 0.279
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 2.6: Relationship loans are more likely to be upgraded and less likely
to be downgraded 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 years after issuance. This table shows
results of an ordered logistic regression of rating changes on relationship measures and
credit controls. The dependent variable is ordered as follows: 1 = downgrade, 2 = no
rating change, and 3 = upgrade. Borrower-lender relationships are measured as the
number of coherent years the borrower and the lead arranging bank has interacted.
At the loan level dummies are included for secured/unsecured loans and loan type.
Standard errors are clustered at the firm level and displayed in parentheses.
Dependent variable:
Rating Change After
1 Year 2 Years 3 Years 4 Years 5 Years
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Relationship Length 0.048 0.107∗∗∗ 0.166∗∗∗ 0.263∗∗∗ 0.293∗∗
(0.030) (0.037) (0.047) (0.071) (0.148)
SecuredNo −0.644 −1.874∗∗ −1.468 1.160
(0.949) (0.953) (1.609) (0.774)
SecuredYes 0.082 −0.576∗∗ 0.697 0.682
(0.306) (0.254) (0.554) (0.666)
Year-quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Currency FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Loan type FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
McFadden’s R2 0.051 0.082 0.078 0.138 0.154
Observations 1,340 836 498 250 121
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 2.7: Relationship loans trade at higher prices on the secondary market
than non-relationship loans. This table reports results of regressing monthly loan
prices on relationship measures and controls. I use two different measures of borrower-
lender relationship: Relationship length and Relationship intensity. Controls include
dummies indicating whether the loan is secured or not, the borrower’s Z-score and
log size at the time the loan is issued. Specification (5) and (6) includes the lagged
transaction price, provided that the loan traded within the past year.
Dependent variable:
Price
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Relationship length 0.041 0.040 0.031∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.031) (0.011)
Relationship intensity 1.020∗∗∗ 1.067∗∗∗ 0.017
(0.221) (0.227) (0.072)
lagPrice 0.838∗∗∗ 0.850∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004)
Unsecured 1.863∗∗ 0.833 1.931∗∗ 0.746
(0.820) (0.833) (0.839) (0.851)
Secured 0.939∗∗ −0.187 0.980∗ −0.250
(0.476) (0.493) (0.504) (0.519)
log(Total assets) −0.270∗∗∗ −0.290∗∗∗ −0.281∗∗∗ −0.349∗∗∗
(0.080) (0.082) (0.084) (0.086)
Z-score 0.822∗∗∗ 0.826∗∗∗ 0.864∗∗∗ 0.855∗∗∗
(0.073) (0.077) (0.075) (0.079)
Interest rate spread 0.001 −0.001
(0.001) (0.001)
Year-month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Currency FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Loan type FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 7,156 6,456 6,946 6,274 22,308 17,530
R2 0.363 0.365 0.362 0.365 0.791 0.811
Adjusted R2 0.351 0.352 0.350 0.352 0.790 0.810
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 2.8: Transaction prices of relationship loans are less volatile. This table
reports results of a linear regression of price dispersion measures on relationship length
between the borrower and lender. Relationship length is the number of years the lender
has acted as credit supplier for the borrower at the time the loan is issued. Pre crisis
is a dummy equal to 1 if the loan is issued before July 2007. Total asset and Z-score
is the size and Altman’s Z-score of the borrower at the time the loan is issued.
Dependent variable:
Volatility Adj. volatility RMSE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Relationship length −0.197∗∗∗ −0.154∗ −0.086∗∗∗ −0.080∗∗ −0.283∗∗∗ −0.155
(0.048) (0.079) (0.023) (0.037) (0.078) (0.127)
D(PreCrisis) 6.597∗∗∗ 5.410∗∗∗ 2.632∗∗∗ 2.366∗∗∗ 10.870∗∗∗ 8.899∗∗∗
(0.305) (0.517) (0.149) (0.245) (0.495) (0.830)
log(Total assets) 0.098 0.063 0.315
(0.205) (0.097) (0.329)
Z-score −0.570∗∗∗ −0.254∗∗∗ −1.260∗∗∗
(0.193) (0.091) (0.309)
Constant 3.064∗∗∗ 2.956∗ 1.700∗∗∗ 1.476∗ 4.174∗∗∗ 3.123
(0.179) (1.772) (0.088) (0.841) (0.291) (2.843)
Observations 1,249 351 1,249 351 1,249 351
R2 0.300 0.281 0.224 0.254 0.303 0.286
Adjusted R2 0.299 0.273 0.223 0.246 0.302 0.278
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Chapter 3
Revisiting the Lead-Lag
Relationship Between Corporate
Bonds and Credit Default Swaps
with Peter Feldhu¨tter and David Lando
Abstract:
In a simulation study, we show that prevailing lead-lag tests in the literature, i.e.
Granger causality, the Hasbrouck measure, and the Gonzalo Granger measure, are bi-
ased if asset prices include a microstructural noise component, in the form of a bid-ask
spread or a time-varying liquidity component. The microstructural noise component
creates negative autocorrelation in price increments which biases the tests in favor of
finding that information flows from the market without microstructural noise to the
market with microstructural noise. Testing the lead-lag relationship between CDS and
corporate bonds, we find that price discovery increases in the corporate bond mar-
ket when we use a method that is not prone to this bias. Furthermore, when using
end-of-day corporate bond transactions, we demonstrate the importance of taking into
account what time during the day the transaction is executed.
We are grateful for helpful comments from seminar participants at Copenhagen Business School.
All authors gratefully acknowledge support from the FRIC Center for Financial Frictions (grant no.
DNRF102).
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1 Introduction
The yield of a firm’s corporate bond and the spread of a CDS written on the same firm
both reflect the credit risk of the firm. An arbitrage argument dictates that the yield
of the bond must equal the CDS spread with the same maturity plus a risk free rate.
Empirically this has been true up until the financial crisis of 2007-2009 as illustrated in
Figure 3.1. The widening of the basis between the CDS and the corporate bond spread
(corporate bond yield minus risk free rate) during the financial crises has largely been
driven by a steep drop in corporate bond liquidity.1 After the crises the CDS-bond
basis has contracted when we consider the average of the cross-section of firms, however
there’s still a disconnect between the two markets when we look at individual entities,
illustrated by the large band between the 25% and 75% quantiles in Figure 3.1.
The disconnect between the two markets raises the question on which market first
incorporates new information on the credit risk of the underlying, or put in other
words, which market is price leading? Are corporate bond investors watching the CDS
market for price changes or are dealers in the CDS market watching the corporate bond
market for price changes. The so called lead-lag relationship between the two markets
can be tested in several ways. Most recognized is Granger causality, Hasbrouck’s
measure and Gonzalo Granger’s measure. In this paper we show how these methods
can produce biased results when financial data is exposed to microstructural noise.
This has implications for earlier papers studying the lead-lag relationship in financial
markets such as Blanco, Brennan, and Marsh (2005). We repeat the analysis of Blanco
et. al. using a longer sample period and including both quotes and transaction data.
First, using the same method as Blanco et. al. we find results similar to theirs. Next,
using an unbiased test, we find – in contrast to Blanco et. al. – that the corporate
bond market price leads the CDS market in some periods. This result is driven by the
methodology – not the sample selection.
To illustrating how microstructural noise in financial data can bias the results of
traditional price discovery methodologies, we run two simulation studies. In the paper
we focus on the Granger causality test and report results of the Hasbrouck measure
and the Gonzalo Granger measure in the appendix. First, we simulate two time series
1See for example Bao, Pan, and Wang (2011) and Bai and Collin-Dufresne (2013).
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of prices where one series represents transaction data with a bid-ask spread incorpo-
rated. We find an overwhelming tendency to attribute price discovery to the market
without a bid-ask spread, though the two time series are simulated such that they both
reflect the contemporaneous risk. Second, we run a simulation experiment where one
time series mimics bid quotes with a time-varying bid-ask spread. Again, we find that
the times series without a microstructural noise element is price leading, though the
two time series are simulated such that they both reflect the contemporaneous risk.
Common for the time series with a bid-ask spread and the time series of time-varying
bid quotes is that their increments both are negatively autocorrelated. We show that
this negative autocorrelation is the direct driver of the biased results. Furthermore, we
document that time series of corporate bond spread increments have negative autocor-
relation independent of whether we consider transaction data or daily quotes. We find
no evidence of CDS spread increments having negative autocorrelation. It is there-
fore possible that earlier findings of the CDS market price leading the corporate bond
market documented with Granger causality, Hasbrouck, or Gonzalo Granger are me-
chanically driven by a negative autocorrelation in corporate bond spread increments.
Next, we test for price discovery in the two markets using a Granger causality test
and an approach that is not affected by negative autocorrelation in the time series. In
the pre-crisis sample period (2002-2005) we find that the CDS is price leading in 20%
of the firms and that the bond is price leading in 24% of the firms according to the
unbiased test. That is, the corporate bond market is more often price leading than
the CDS market. Furthermore, the difference between price discovery is statistically
significant in 2004 and 2005. The results of the Granger causality test shows on the
other hand that CDS spreads lead for 27% of the firms and that the corporate bond
market only price leads for 20% of the firms. This result is in line with those of
Blanco, Brennan, and Marsh (2005), Zhu (2006), and Norden and Weber (2009). We
conclude that the corporate bond market price leads in this period, but that a biased
test incorrectly concludes the opposite. In the remainder of the sample we find that
the CDS market price leads the corporate bond market. However, using the Granger
causality test leads to over-estimation of the contribution to price discovery from the
CDS market with more than 100%.
The first analysis is done on a sample of CDS and corporate bonds quotes. While
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CDS transaction prices are hard to come around, corporate bond transaction prices
are publicly available through the Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE).
Next we include these corporate bond transaction prices in the sample by substituting
corporate bond quotes with end-of-day transaction prices on days where the corporate
bond traded. We find that price discovery in the corporate bond market increases
when we utilize information from corporate bond transactions. The contribution to
price discovery was on average 3.5%-points higher in the CDS market than in the
corporate bond market in the sample consisting of only corporate bond quotes. The
average contribution to price discovery from the CDS market is only 1.5%-points higher
than the contribution from the corporate bond market in the sample which includes
corporate bond transactions.
Most of the data points in the corporate bond quotes plus transactions sample
are quoted data, since many bonds do not trade very often. To test the information
flow from transaction data directly we run the test again but considering only days
where the corporate bond was traded. We now find that the bond market price leads
3%-points more often than the CDS market on average in the full sample period.
This difference is significant at the 10% level. Some of the end-of-day transactions
are executed early during the day while all CDS quotes are committed at 5pm. This
implies that some corporate bond prices are lagged a few hours compared to the CDS
spreads they are tested against. To run a fair test of the relative price discovery in
the CDS market and the corporate bond market we repeat the test including only
days where the bond traded after 3 pm. This test finds that the bond is price leading
9%-points more often than the CDS on average across the full sample period. This
difference is significant at the 5% level. Very few bonds trade often enough for one
to rely completely on transaction data for updates on price movements. Hence we
consider the sample consisting of corporate bond quotes augmented with transaction
data as the optimal data to search for price movements in corporate bond market.
It is possible that the increase in price discovery in the corporate bond market, we
find when we use transaction dates, is partly driven by a selection bias in the sample
we examine. When we examine transaction data we are simultaneously narrowing
down to a sample of the most liquid bonds – those bonds that trade often, and often
after 3 pm. To reject the notion that the result is completely driven by a selection
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bias we next investigate the relation between the liquidity of the bond and the CDS
market and the relative price discovery in each of the markets. We sort the sample into
portfolios based on relative liquidity in the two markets and find that price discovery
in the CDS market significantly increases when CDS liquidity increases. The results
are insignificant and inconclusive for the corporate bond market. These results suggest
that while liquidity is important for price discovery in the CDS market, it does not
seem to be the main factor for price discovery in the corporate bond market.
Our finding, that prevailing price discovery methods are prone to biases, has large
implication for earlier papers studying the lead-lag relationship between CDS and
bonds. Blanco, Brennan, and Marsh (2005), Zhu (2006), Norden and Weber (2009),
and Forte and Pena (2009) study the lead-lag relationship between CDS and corporate
bonds. All of these papers find that the CDS market dominates the price discovery pro-
cess, however as they are all using Granger causality, Hasbrouck, or Gonzalo Granger
their results are possibly biased. Ammer and Cai (2011) and Aktug, Vasconcellos, and
Bae (2012) study the lead-lag relationship between government bonds and CDS. Both
papers find that the bond market is price leading which is in contrast to the corpo-
rate studies. Government bonds are more liquid than corporate bonds which implies
that microstructural noise components such as a time-varying bid-ask spreads is less
significant in government bond data and a lead-lag test are therefore less likely biased.
Moreover, our result has implications for studies that, using Granger causality,
Hasbrouck, or Gonzalo Granger, quantify the lead-lag relationship between other mar-
kets. Narayan, Sharma, and Thuraisamy (2014), Hilscher, Pollet, and Wilson (2015),
Marsh and Wagner (2016), and Kryzanowski, Perrakis, and Zhong (2017) study the
lead-lag relationship between the CDS and equity market. The direction of a potential
methodology bias is not clear in this case but depends on the respective autocorrelation
pattern in these markets. Acharya and Johnson (2007) study the lead lag relationship
between CDS and equity as well, but use CDS innovations in their regression which by
construction are orthogonal to the equity return. Their test is therefore not prone to
the bias we describe. Finally, Ronen and Zhou (2013) study the lead-lag relationship
between the corporate bond and equity market. Closely related to our paper they
find that price discovery switches from the equity market to the bond market if bond
trading features are accounted for.
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2 Biases in Traditional Price Discovery Methods
The most common method to assess whether information incorporate into one market
faster than the other is Granger causality Granger (1969). This method is used among
others by Blanco, Brennan, and Marsh (2005) and Zhu (2006) to study the lead-lag
relationship between corporate bonds and CDS. In this section we run two simulation
experiments showing how market microstructure effects in financial data can lead us
to conclude that one market is price leading when in fact it is not.2
Before we move on to the simulation experiment we will briefly go though the
concept of price discovery and the methodology behind Granger causality.
2.1 The Granger Causality Test
Consider two time series driven by the same underlying process, say a time series of
CDS spread and a time series of corporate bond spreads. The purpose of the Granger
causality test is to test which of the two assets reacts fastest to new information, i.e., in
which market price discovery takes place. If the Granger causality finds that one asset
– say the CDS spread – Granger causes the other asset, an increase in the CDS spread
today will in expectation be followed by an increase in the corporate bond spread one
period from now.
To test for Granger causality between CDS spreads and corporate bond spreads
we estimate a VAR model on CDS spread increment and corporate bond spread incre-
ments:
∆CDSt = α
CDS +
p∑
j=1
βbond,j∆bondt−j +
p∑
j=1
γCDS,j∆CDSt−j + εCDSt (3.1)
∆bondt = α
bond +
p∑
j=1
βCDS,j∆CDSt−j +
p∑
j=1
γbond,j∆bondt−j + εbondt , (3.2)
where CDSt is the CDS spread at time t, bondt is the spread between the corporate
bond yield and the risk free rate at time t, ∆ denotes first differences, and p is the
number of lags included in the regression. As a rule we use 5 lags in the regression
2Gonzalo and Granger’s measure and Hasbrouck’s measure are two other popular methods for
assessing price discovery. In Appendix A we show that these measures are biased in the same way as
the Granger causality test.
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implying that we allow one of the markets to lead by up to 5 business days. Changing
the number of lags in the regression to 10 or 1 does not change the empirical results.
The Granger causality test concludes that the corporate bond Granger causes the
CDS if the sum of βbond,j ’s is significant according to an F-test and likewise that the
CDS Granger causes the corporate bond if the sum of βCDS,j ’s is significant according
to an F-test.
Granger causality can, and often does, go both ways in which case we conclude
that both markets are price leading. In such cases Blanco, Brennan, and Marsh (2005)
deduce the relative contribution to the price discovery process from each market by
comparing the sum of βbond,j to the sum of βCDS,j . The largest sum the corresponds
to the market that contributes most to the price discovery process. However, the size
of the β coefficient is highly sensitive to the relative volatility of the two time series
as well as potential microstructural noise in the data, as will become apparent in the
simulation study. Therefore, we find that it is not meaningful to compare the sizes of
the β coefficients.
2.2 Simulation Studies
Our simulation studies are based on a corporate bond and CDS price model similar
to that of Blanco, Brennan, and Marsh (2005). The so called unobserved “efficient”
credit spread follows a random walk
mt = mt−1 + ut, (3.3)
where ut is i.i.d. normally distributed with mean 0 and variance σ
2. For simplicity, we
assume that the CDS market has no microstructural noise, and that the bond market
has one noise component, st.
3
CDSt = mt, (3.4)
bondt = mt + st, (3.5)
3Blanco, Brennan, and Marsh (2005) let market prices of both corporate bond and CDS spreads be
equal to mt plus a market specific transient and a market specific non-transient microstructural noise
component.
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The noise component, st, represents some market microstructural friction in financial
data.
We run two simulation studies that each incorporate one microstructural friction
that is common in financial data. In the first simulation study we let bond be trans-
action prices that alternate between being executed at the bid and the ask price. The
fact that bond prices jump between bid and ask prices will generate negative autocor-
relation in corporate bond spread increments which transmits into a biased Granger
causality test. In the second simulation study we let bond be bid quotes in a setting
with time-varying and mean reverting bid-ask spread. The mean reversion in the bid-
ask spread implies negative autocorrelation in bond spread increments which again
implies a biased Granger causality test. The connection between the negative autocor-
relation in bond spreads and the biased Granger causality test is explained in detail
in section 2.3.
Simulation study with transaction data executed at the bid-ask spread
Acharya and Johnson (2007) use transaction data to study price discovery in the CDS
and stock market. In this section we illustrate how the structure of transaction data
can bias the result of a Granger causality test.
We simulate st such that it takes the value k with probability 1/2 and −k with
probability 1/2. That is, st represents transaction data when prices are executed at
the bid or ask at random with a bid-ask spread equal to 2k. The structure of st
implies a negative autocorrelation in st’s increments which transmits into a negative
autocorrelation in corporate bond spread increments.
We simulate paths of m and s that are 365 observations long – corresponding to the
average CDS and corporate bond time series length in Blanco, Brennan, and Marsh
(2005) – and test for Granger causality between CDS and bond. We set the volatility
of the efficient credit spread, σ, equal to 16 basis points, which corresponds to the
median time series standard deviation of daily changes in 5 year CDS quotes in Markit
- the leading database on CDS spreads. Dick-Nielsen, Feldhu¨tter, and Lando (2012)
find the upper quartile, median, and lower quartile of bid-ask spreads in corporate
bond transactions to be 41 basis points, 22 basis points, and 12 basis points. As k is
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the half spread we select k equal to 20 basis points, 11 basis points, and 6 basis points.
For each set of parameters we run 10,000 simulation and test for Granger causality by
estimating equation (3.1) and (3.2) with number of lags, p, equal to 5.
Results of the first simulation study are summarized in Panel A of Table 3.1. The
base case with bid-ask spread set to the median empirical value (22 basis points)
implies autocorrelation of ∆bond to be -0.24. The Granger causality test finds that
the CDS Granger causes bond in all simulations and that bond is Granger causing in
5% of the simulations matching the expected false positive rate. The table also shows
the median sum of the estimated β coefficients in each simulation. The median sum of
βCDS ’s equals 2.5 and the median sum of βbond’s equals 0 which furthermore indicates
that CDS is price leading. Increasing the bid-ask spread increases the autocorrelation
of ∆bond, and likewise decreasing the bid-ask spread decreases the autocorrelation of
∆bond. In both cases CDS is still Granger causing in all simulations. However, CDS
and bond is simulated such that both time series reflect the contemporaneous credit
risk, implying that none of the assets price lead the other in the way price lead-lag
relationships are suppose to be understood.
The test is highly sensitive to the length of the simulated time series. Adding more
observations to the time series increases the power of the test and the test will more
often conclude that CDS price leads. Even with a very small bid ask spread, CDS will
always be price leading as long as we have long enough time series.
Simulation study with bid quotes and time-varying bid-ask spread
Several papers that study the lead-lag relationship in the corporate bond market use
quote data instead of transaction data. Most databases with corporate bond quotes
provides bid quotes, including the Lehman Brothers Fixed Income database (Warga
(1998) and Lin, Wang, and Wu (2014)) and the Merrill Lynch data used in this paper
(Feldhu¨tter and Schaefer (2017)). Our second simulation experiment illustrates how a
time series of bid quotes can have negative autocorrelation if bid-ask spreads are time-
varying, and how the negative autocorrelation bias the result of a Granger causality
test.
We simulate a time-varying bid-ask spread as an AR(1) process and impose a
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positivity condition
BAt = µ+ ρBAt−1 + t, t ∼ N(0, σBA) (3.6)
Bid-askt = max{BAt; 0} (3.7)
The long term mean and volatility of this process is determined by the parameters µ, ρ,
and σBA. Dick-Nielsen, Feldhu¨tter, and Lando (2012) find that the median bond has
average bid-ask spread equal to 22 basis points and that the volatility of the bid-ask
spread is 22 basis points. We examine the bid-ask spread process for different values of
the persistence parameter, ρ, and adjust µ and σBA to fit the empirical values observed
in Dick-Nielsen, Feldhu¨tter, and Lando (2012).
We repeat the 10,000 simulations of CDS and bond from the first simulation ex-
periment, but now st is equal to Bid-askt/2, and test for Granger causality between
CDS and bond. The autocorrelation of Bid-ask is positive but the autocorrelation of
∆Bid-ask is negative. Hence, we expect a negative autocorrelation in ∆bond.
Panel B of Table 3.1 summarizes results of the second simulation experiment. With
the persistence parameter, ρ, equal to 0.9, the autocorrelation of ∆bond is -0.05. The
percentage of tests where CDS price leads is 20% and the percentage of tests where
bond price leads is 5% matching the expected false positive rate. The sum of βCDS ’s
equals 0.355 and the sum of βbond’s is close to 0. As in the simulation experiment
with transaction prices the conclusion of the Granger causality is biased towards CDS
spreads leading corporate bond spreads. However, the bias of the test is smaller in this
simulation study due to the modest autocorrelation of ∆bond.
Decreasing the persistence parameter, ρ, amplifies the negative autocorrelation
of ∆s and thereby the negative autocorrelation of ∆bond. Furthermore, the higher
the negative autocorrelation is, the higher is the percentage of tests where CDS is
Granger causing and the higher is the sum of βCDS,js. The percentage of tests where
bond Granger causes and the sum of βbond,js remain unchanged.
As in the first simulation experiment, the Granger causality test is biased towards
finding price discovery in the CDS market rather than in the corporate bond market,
though there is no cross-correlation between the two time series and both time series
reflect the contemporaneous risk. Furthermore, this simulation experiment illustrates
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the connection between the negative autocorrelation of ∆bond and the results of the
Granger causality test. The more negative the autocorrelation of ∆bond is, the more
biased is the Granger causality test.
2.3 Testing the Lead-Lag Relationship when Autocorrelations of the Input
Series are Non-Zero
The bias in the Granger causality test stems from the negative autocorrelation in
∆bond. As the autocorrelation of ∆bond becomes more negative the test becomes
more biased (see Table 3.1). To understand the connection between the negative
autocorrelation and this bias consider the Granger causality test in a setting with just
one lag.
∆CDSt = α
CDS + βbond∆bondt−1 + γCDS∆CDSt−1 + εCDSt (3.8)
∆bondt = α
bond + βCDS∆CDSt−1 + γbond∆bondt−1 + εbondt . (3.9)
Inserting CDSt = mt and bondt = mt + st into Equation (3.9) we get:
∆mt + ∆st = α
bond + βCDS∆mt−1 + γbond(∆mt−1 + ∆st−1) + εbondt
= αbond + (βCDS + γbond)∆mt−1 + γbond∆st−1 + εbondt (3.10)
Estimating equation (3.10) yields γbond = θ, where θ is the autocorrelation of ∆st.
As mt is Markov, the autocorrelation of ∆mt is 0 which implies (β
CDS + γbond) = 0
and we get βCDS = −θ. The autocorrelation of ∆st in the above simulation stud-
ies is negative which means that βCDS is positive and significant as long as we have
sufficiently many observations. Estimating (3.8) gives βbond = γCDS = 0. Hence the
Granger causality test concludes that CDSt price leads bondt. Alternatively, if the
autocorrelation of ∆st is positive we get that β
CDS is negative and significant. The
significance of βCDS implies that changes in CDSt predict changes in bondt but the
negative sign implies that an increase in CDSt implies a decrease in bondt which is un-
intuitive in terms of lead-lag relationships. However, focusing only on the significance
of βCDS which is the criteria for concluding on the lead-lag relationship, the Granger
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causality test concludes again that CDSt price leads bondt.
The lead-lag results we find in the above examples have nothing to do with what
we normally think of as lead-lag relationships. The above results stem only from the
negative autocorrelation in ∆st and not from movements in one market, induced by a
changes in the fundamental value of the asset, being followed by similar movements in
the other market. Hence, instead of using one of the prevailing methods for testing the
lead-lag relationship which all are biased by the negative autocorrelation in ∆st, as
documented above (Granger causality) and in the appendix (Hasbrouck and Gonzales
Granger), we will asses price discovery using a similar specification to that of Stoll and
Whaley (1990), Chan (1992), and Kwan (1996). We regress current changes of one
asset on lagged changes of the other asset:
∆CDSt = α
CDS +
p∑
j=1
βbond,j∆bondt−j + ηCDSt (3.11)
∆bondt = α
bond +
p∑
j=1
βCDS,j∆CDSt−j + ηbondt . (3.12)
As with Granger causality we conclude that the CDS market is price leading if βCDS,js
are jointly significant and vice versa that the bond market price leads if βbond,js are
jointly significant according to a F-test. The difference between this specification and
Granger causality is that we do not have the lagged values of the dependent variable
on the right-hand side of the equation. Hence, autocorrelation in the time series will
not affect the test results in this model. For now on we will refer to this model as the
unbiased model.
If the autocorrelation of changes in the efficient price of credit risk, ∆m, is non zero
and if both CDS and bond reflect the underlying risk perfectly, then the test will find
that both markets price leads, when in fact the two market are perfectly correlated.
This can lead to overestimation of the price discovery, but the overestimation will
always be the same in both markets. This means that as long as we consider the
relative price discovery in the CDS and the corporate bond markets – which is standard
– the overestimation will not affect our conclusions.
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3 Data
CDS spreads are from Markit, the leading database in providing CDS spreads. Markit
receives data from more than 50 global banks and each contributor provides pricing
data from its books of record and from feeds to automated trading systems. These
data are aggregated into composite numbers after filtering out outliers and stale data
and a price is published only if a minimum of three contributors provide data.
The sample of CDS spreads is matched with bonds issued by the same firms. Bond
information is obtained from Mergent FISD. We restrict the sample to senior unsecured
bonds that pay fixed interest. We use two sources of corporate bond data. First, we
employ a sample of daily corporate bond quotes provided by Merrill Lynch. This
dataset is used by Schaefer and Strebulaev (2008), Acharya, Amihud, and Bharath
(2013), and Feldhu¨tter and Schaefer (2017). Furthermore, corporate bond transactions
data are obtained from Financial Industry Regulatory Authority’s (FINRA) Trade
Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE). Since July 1, 2002, all dealers have
been required to report their secondary over-the-counter corporate bond transactions
through TRACE. We apply standard filters (Dick-Nielsen (2009) and Dick-Nielsen
(2014)) to clean the dataset for errors and exclude transactions of volumes below
$100.000 as suggested in Bessembinder, Kahle, Maxwell, and Xu (2009).
Finally, we obtain swap rates from the Federal Reserve Bank’s webpage and U.S.
Treasury yields from the Federal Reserve Bank’s CMT rates.4 Corporate bond spreads
are calculated as the corporate bond yield minus the swap or Treasury yield with the
same maturity and where the swap or Treasury yield is interpolated from the closest
yields that have a shorter and longer maturity.
The final sample consists of 1244 firms and runs from 2002 to 2012 where the bond
quote sample ends. We split the sample in calendar years and have 5391 firm-year
observations in total. We always use the 5 year maturity CDS spread. When more
than one bond is available, we use the yield of the most recently issued bond which
Ronen and Zhou (2013) show are the most informative.
4The data is available on http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data.htm.
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3.1 The Riskfree Rate
To calculate the corporate bond yield spread, we need a riskfree rate. Treasury yields
have typically been used in the past, but Hull, Predescu, and White (2004), Feldhu¨tter
and Lando (2008), and Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jørgensen (2012) show that swap
rates are – although not perfect – a better proxy than Treasury yields. To a large
extent this is due to Treasury bonds enjoying a convenience yield that pushes their
yields below riskfree rates (Feldhu¨tter and Lando (2008), Krishnamurthy and Vissing-
Jørgensen (2012), and Nagel (2016)).
Our sample period includes the 2008-2009 crisis; a period where LIBOR, the un-
derlying rate in swap contracts, was high because of credit risk. It may be that in this
particular period swap rates became somewhat disconnected from the riskfree rate. To
test the extent to which swap rates are appropriate to use as riskfree rates during 2008-
2009 we examine a set of government guaranteed bonds issued by financial institutions
in the US. On October 13th 2008 the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation started
the Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program (TLGP) as a reaction to the financial
crisis. The program was one of many programs to improve funding possibilities of
financial institutions in the US. It was optional for financial institutions to enter the
program and debt issued by members of the program would, in a limited period ending
in 2012, be guaranteed by the US government. This implied that the bonds were free
from default risk (or more precisely had the same default risk as US Treasury bonds).
For this service financial institutions would pay a fee. In total 169 guaranteed bonds
were issued by 31 financial institutions in the period November 2008 to October 2009
and the bonds matured in the period April 2009 to December 2012.
To examine the liquidity of the guaranteed bonds we compute roundtrip costs
(RTC) for corporate bonds. For each corporate bond transaction, TRACE makes
available whether the transaction refers to a bond bought by an investor from a dealer,
sold by an investor to dealer, or an inter-dealer trade. We compute RTC of bond i on
day t as
RTCdailyit =
P buyit − P sellit
P buyit
(3.13)
where P buyit is the average of all investor buy prices of bond i on day t and P
sell
it is
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the average of investor sell prices of bond i on day t. As in Feldhu¨tter, Hotchkiss, and
Karakas (2016), we define the RTC of a bond as the median of available daily RTCs
over the past two weeks.
We plot average roundtrip costs (RTC) in Figure 3.2 for the guaranteed bonds along
with average RTCs for bonds issued by the same financial institutions and that were not
guaranteed. We see that RTCs are much smaller for the guaranteed bonds compared
to the unguaranteed bonds; the average RTC for unguaranteed bonds is 0.38% in
the period January 2009-December 2012 while the average RTC for guaranteed bonds
in the same period is 0.05%. Thus, guaranteed bonds are more liquid compared to
unguaranteed bonds when measured as the cost of trading the bonds. Using the same
methodology to compute transaction costs, Chakravarty and Sarkar (2003) estimate
average RTC for U.S. Treasury bonds in the period 1995-1997 to be 0.08%.5 This
suggests that the liquidity of the guaranteed bonds is comparable to the liquidity of
U.S. Treasury bonds.
The guaranteed bonds are liquid and free of default risk, but nevertheless are
corporate bonds and therefore do not enjoy the convenience yield of U.S. Treasuries.6
These bonds are therefore a near-ideal measure of the appropriate riskfree rate when
calculating corporate bond spreads. Figure 3.3 shows a time series of the guaranteed
bond yield, swap rate, and Treasury yield. Guaranteed bond yield is calculated as the
average of the daily yields on all fixed coupon guaranteed bonds where daily yields
are calculated as the median over daily values. Swap rates and Treasury yields are
similarly calculated as the average of rates maturity matched to all guaranteed bonds
in our sample. We see that the swap rate tracks the yield on guaranteed bonds quite
closely while there is a gap between the yields on guaranteed bonds and Treasury
bonds. The average yield on the guaranteed bonds during the period covered by the
graph (November 2008 - May 2011) is 1.18%, the average swap rate is 1.22%, and
the average Treasury yield is 0.85%. This shows that even during the 2008-2009 crisis
swap rates are more appropriate than Treasury yields to use as riskfree rates when
5Chakravarty and Sarkar (2003) measure RTC as P buyit −P sellit while we measure RTC as P
buy
it −Psellit
P
buy
it
but since most bonds likely trade close to par value due to their relatively short maturity, the difference
between the measures is small.
6Benefit of Treasury bonds compared to guaranteed corporate bonds are for example lower risk
weights and broader collateral eligibility.
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calculating corporate bond yield spreads.7
4 Price Discovery in the Corporate Bond and CDS Market
Blanco, Brennan, and Marsh (2005), Zhu (2006), and Norden and Weber (2009) test
the lead-lag relationship between CDS and corporate bond spreads using the Granger
causality test, Hasbrouck’s measure, and Gonzalo and Granger’s measure and find
that CDS leads the corporate bond market. In Section 2 we show that results of these
methods are biased when autocorrelation of one of the tested time series is non-zero.
Figure 3.4 shows histograms of autocorrelation in changes in CDS spreads and changes
in corporate bond quotes of the 1244 firms in our sample with bonds quoted by Merrill
Lynch, and a histogram of changes in end-of-day corporate bond transactions for the
763 firms with bonds trading persistent enough for us to utilize TRACE transaction.
The median autocorrelation for CDS spread, Merrill Lynch corporate bond spread,
and TRACE corporate bond spreads is 0.01, -0.13, and -0.37 respectively. That is,
autocorrelation of the CDS spreads is close to zero, but the autocorrelation of bond
spreads is negative. If the autocorrelation pattern is the same in samples used in the
above mentioned papers, it is likely that their results are biased towards favoring price
discovery in the CDS market.
We test the lead-lag relationship between CDS and corporate bond spreads using
a Granger causality test and using the unbiased model presented in Section 2.3 in
which results are unaffected by negative autocorrelation in corporate bond spreads.
Our sample covers 11 years from 2002 to 2012. We split the sample into calendar years
such that we can capture time variation in the relative price discovery in the corporate
bond and CDS markets. Each year we use the yield spreads of the most recently
issued corporate bond which Ronen and Zhou (2013) show are the most informative.
The unbiased model builds on estimating Equation (3.11) and (3.12), and the Granger
causality test builds on estimating Equation (3.1) and (3.2). To make our analysis
simple and transparent we choose to estimate the models with five lags (p = 5) for all
firms.8
7Preferably we would use the guaranteed yield as the risk free rate in our further analyses. However,
this rate is only available for the period 2008-2012 and only for short maturities, thus we are left with
the swap rate as the best proxy the risk free rate.
8We have run the tests with 1 and 10 lags as well and get similar results.
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Table 3.2 shows, for each calendar year and for both tests, the percentage of firms
where CDS price leads, the percentage of firms where bond price leads and the differ-
ence between the two. In the first four years of the sample the unbiased model finds
that the CDS market price leads for 20% of the firms on average and that the corpo-
rate bond market price leads for 24% of the firms on average. Hence the corporate
bond market is 4% more often price leading than the CDS market. This result sug-
gest a small tendency towards the corporate bonds marked being more price leading
than CDS market in the first part of the sample. This contradicts findings of Blanco,
Brennan, and Marsh (2005), Zhu (2006), and Norden and Weber (2009) who study
a sample covering the same period. Interestingly, their findings are in line with the
result of the Granger causality test. The Granger causality test finds that CDS price
leads for 27% of the firms on average and that bond price leads for only 20% of firms
on average. That is, the Granger causality test both overestimates the contribution
to price discovery from the CDS market and underestimates the contribution to price
discovery from the bond market. This finding illustrates that it is not a sample selec-
tion that give us a different result from those in earlier studies, it is the methodology
used for testing price discovery.
After 2005 the relative price discovery between the CDS and the corporate bond
market changes such that the CDS market becomes more price leading relative to the
corporate bond market. According to the unbiased test, the difference between price
discovery in the CDS market and price discovery in the bond market is 8% on average.
The difference is 17% on average in the Granger causality test. Though, we conclude
in both analyses that most price discovery arises in the CDS market, we overestimate
the contribution from the CDS market more than 100% if we rely on the Granger
causality test.
Next, we investigate if price discovery differs between the financial sector and non-
financial sectors and if price discovery differs between investment grade and speculative
grade rated firms. Panel A of Table 3.3 show that CDS is relatively more price leading
for financials than for non-financials in all sub periods, in line with the fact that the
CDS market is far more developed for financials than other corporates. Panel B of
Table 3.3 shows that CDS is relative more price leading for speculative grade rated
firms than for investment grade rated firms.
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4.1 Improving Price Discovery in the Corporate Bond Market with Trans-
action Data
The above analysis uses quotes on both CDS spreads and corporate bond yields. These
quotes are non-executable and may not represent the most updated information in
the respective markets. A better way to obtain the most recent information is from
executed transaction prices. However, executed transaction prices are not publicly
available for CDS as they are for corporate bonds. In this section, we examine what
happens to the lead-lag relationship between the CDS and the corporate bond market
if we utilize publicly available transactions data on corporate bonds. We hypothesize
that price discovery in the corporate bond market improves as transaction prices are
never stale and as they represent the exact market value of the respective asset. This
sample of CDS quotes and corporate bond transaction data combined with corporate
bond quotes represents a data sample that is accessible to individuals.
We create a corporate bond spread sample by augmenting the corporate bond
quote sample with transaction data. Specifically, on days where the corporate bond
has traded two days in a row we substitute the yield spread change in corporate bond
quotes with the yield spread change in end-of-day transactions. This sample allow
us to to utilize the excess information in transaction data without losing information
from the bond market on days where the bond did not trade. Results of the unbiased
lead-lag test are reported in the first 6 columns of Panel A in Table 3.4. Comparing
these results to those of the analysis using only quoted data we find that the relative
lead-lag relationship between CDS and corporate bonds is roughly unchanged in the
first five years of the sample. In the financial crisis from 2007 to 2009 the difference
between price discovery in the CDS market and the corporate bond market drops
from 7% on average to 3.7% on average when we include transaction data. Finally,
in the last three years of the sample the average difference drops from 10% to 6.3%.
Furthermore, significance of the difference between price discovery in the two markets
disappears in 2007 and 2012. All in all we find that price discovery in the corporate
bond market increases relative to price discovery in the CDS market when information
from publicly available corporate bond transactions are utilized.
Changes in corporate bond transaction prices are only available for 17% of obser-
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vations and for 25% of the individual bonds it is less than 5% of dates with quoted
yields where the bond has traded two days in a row. The scarcity of transaction data
implies that information in the bond data still primarily comes from quotes. Next, we
test how the relative price discovery in the CDS and corporate bond markets changes
if we only consider days where the bond traded. That is, on each day where the bond
has traded three days in a row, we compute the change in bond spread and the lagged
change in bond spread. All other days where the bond traded less than than three
consecutive days are discarded. If a bond traded three consecutive days less than 20
times within a calendar year, the firm-year is discarded. Equation (3.11) and (3.12)
are then estimated with only one lagged variable on the right-hand side (p = 1) on
each firm on the subsamples of dates where the bond traded three consecutive days.
We choose p = 1 instead of p = 5, as used in the earlier analyses, because the sample
of firms with bonds trading often enough to estimate the equation with p = 5 is very
small.
The second part of Panel A in Table 3.4 summarizes the results of the lead-lag
tests with transactions data. The number of firms and trading days is lower than in
the analyses with corporate bond quotes reflecting that some corporate bonds trade
rarely. The difference between the percentage of firms where the CDS market price
leads and the percentage of firms where the bond market price leads is negative or
close to 0 all years except for 2010, and we conclude that corporate bond transactions
contribute more to the price discovery than CDS quotes on days where the corporate
bond traded.
Next, we compare the relative price discovery in the CDS and corporate bond mar-
kets when bond information stems from transaction data to when bond information
stems from quote data (Table 3.2). In the first five years of the sample the average
difference between price discovery in the CDS market and price discovery in the bond
market drops from -4% on average to -6.2% on average. In the years covering the
financial crisis the relative difference in price discovery drops from 7% to -9.7% and
in the last three years of the sample the difference in price discovery drops from 10%
to 3.7%. Comparing the three choices of corporate bond data sources; quotes, quotes
combined with transactions, and transactions, the relative price discovery in the cor-
porate bond market becomes – as expected – increasingly better. The improvement
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in price discovery in the bond market when going from quote date to transaction data
is especially steep in the years of the financial crisis from 2007 to 2009. This result
shows that in this period either corporate bond transactions are particular informative
and/or corporate bond quotes are particularly uninformative.
The CDS quotes are all registered at 5 pm each date, whereas the end-of-day
transaction can take place almost any time during the day. In the corporate bond
transaction sample 40% of end of day transactions – i.e. the last observed transaction
of the day – occur before 3 pm and 19% of end of day transactions occur before 1
pm. An end of day transaction at 1 pm will not reflect all information of that day to
the same extent as CDS spread quoted at 5 pm. We examine the importance of the
asynchronous transaction data by testing the lead-lag relationship on a subsample of
the observations. First we include all transactions. Then we look at the subsample
of transactions executed after 1pm, that is days, where any of the transactions used
to compute the current change or the lagged change in corporate bond spreads are
executed before 1 pm, are deleted. Finally, we consider the smaller subsample of
transactions executed after 3pm. For this purpose we do not split the sample into
calendar years.
Panel B of Table 3.4 reports the number of tested firm-years in each sample, the
percentage of firm-years where CDS lead, the percentage of firm-years where bond
leads and the difference between the percentage of firm-years where the CDS leads
and the percentage of firm-years where the corporate bond leads. When including
all observations we find that the CDS price leads for 16% of the firms and that the
corporate bond price leads for 19% of the firms. The difference of 3 percentage points
is weakly significant at the 10% level. This means that the corporate bond market
contributes more to the price discovery process than the CDS market on days where
the bond traded, even though some of the end-of-day transactions where executed
earlier than the time of the CDS quote. The percentage of firms where bond price
leads increases from 19% when we include all transactions to 27% in the subsample
which includes end-of-day transactions executed after 3pm. The percentage of tests
where CDS price leads is roughly unchanged. That is, the relative difference between
corporate bond and CDS price discovery increases to 9%-points in the “after 3pm”
sample. Furthermore, the difference in price discovery is now significant at the 5%
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level. We conclude that being aware of the time trades are executed is important and
controlling for transaction time changes the results. This finding is consistent with
Ronen and Zhou (2013) showing that corporate bonds lead stocks when bond trading
features are accounted for.
The subsample of bonds we are left with in this analysis are the most liquid bonds.
Therefore, the apparent improvement in price discovery in the bond market is, possibly,
not only driven by the fact that we are considering transaction data, but also to the fact
that we are testing the most liquid corporate bonds. In the next session we examine
how relative price discovery in the corporate bond and CDS market varies with the
liquidity of both the CDSs and the corporate bonds.
4.2 Price Discovery and Relative Liquidity of the CDS and Corporate
Bond Market
Price discovery is closely related to liquidity. Ammer and Cai (2011) study the lead-lag
relationship between government bonds and CDS and find that the CDS market is less
price leading for sovereigns that issue more bonds, suggesting that the relative liquidity
of the two markets is a key determinant for where price discovery occurs. Presumably,
the more informed investors that actively participate in a market, the closer prices
will be to the fundamental value. In this section we investigate the link between how
active investors are, i.e., how liquid the market for an asset is, and the relative price
discovery between the CDS and the corporate bond.
We approximate the liquidity of each CDS each year by the average number of
dealers who have contributed to the CDS quote. For bonds we use two proxies for
liquidity. First, we measure liquidity as the average of daily round-trip costs (RTC)
(defined in Equation (3.13)) over the calendar year. The drawback of this measure is
that the RTC is not defined for all bonds. We assign high illiquidity to bonds where
the RTC measure is not defined. As an alternative we also measure bond liquidity as
the number of trading days within the calendar year. The problem with this measure
is that we cannot disentangle liquidity from data quality. Above we showed that price
discovery improves when we utilize transaction data. The bonds that trade most often
are, therefore, also the bonds with the best data quality.
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We use the sample of CDS quotes and corporate bond quotes augmented with
transaction data and test the lead-lag relationship between CDS and corporate bond
spreads using the unbiased test. We then compare the test results between portfolios
with different CDS and corporate bond liquidity. Each calendar year we double sort
the firm sample into nine portfolios. First we sort the sample into three portfolios
based on the liquidity of the CDS written on the firm. Next we sort each of these
portfolios into three buckets based on the liquidity of the firm’s corporate bond. We
then collapse all years which give us 9 buckets in total with 610-620 firm-years in each
bucket.
Table 3.5 reports the percentage of test where CDS price leads minus the percentage
of test where corporate bond price leads for each of the 9 portfolios. For example, the
1% in the top left corner of Panel B in the table means that CDS price leads corporates
bond in 1 percentage point more tests than the number of tests where corporate bond
price leads CDS. In Panel A of the table bonds are sorted by their RTC and in Panel
B of the table bonds are sorted by number of trading days. In both panels we see that
the relative price discovery in the CDS market increases when liquidity of the CDS
increases. This is illustrated by the consistently positive values in the bottom rows of
the panels, which indicates the difference between the most and the least liquid CDS
portfolio. Furthermore, four out of six of the differences between the most liquid CDS
portfolio and the least liquid CDS portfolio are statistically significant. Moving to
bond liquidity we cannot make the same conclusion. None of the differences between
the most liquid bond portfolios and the least liquid bond portfolios are statistically
significant. When bonds are sorted by RTC, the values for high CDS liquidity minus
low CDS liquidity have both negative and positive signs. When bonds are sorted by
number of trading days, the values for high CDS liquidity minus low CDS liquidity are
all negative suggesting that increased bond liquidity implies increased price discovery
in the bond market. However, the values are not statistically significant and could also
reflect the fact that the bonds that trade most often are also the bonds with the most
informative spreads, independent of the bonds’ liquidity.
The result of Table 3.5 implies a link between CDS liquidity and the relative price
discovery in the CDS market compared to the price discovery in the corporate bond
market, but the same is not true for the corporate bond market. We see a hint of a
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link between bond trading days and price discovery in the corporate bond market but
no link between bond RTC and price discovery. Based on this we conclude that there
is no evidence for a connection between corporate bond liquidity and price discovery
in the corporate bond market. Furthermore, we conclude, based on this result, that
the improvement in price discovery we find when we subsample the data based on
transaction data is not driven by higher liquidity of the remaining bonds but is rather
driven by higher data quality.
5 Conclusion
We run two simulation studies, each showing that prevailing lead-lag tests in the
literature, i.e., Granger causality, the Hasbrouck measure, and the Gonzalo Granger
measure, are biased if asset prices include a microstructural noise component. In
the first simulation study, we let one of the time series represent transaction prices
that jump between the bid and the ask price. In the second simulation study, we
let one of the time series represent bid quotes in a setting with time-varying bid-ask
spreads. Many different financial data possess one of these two features. In both
simulation studies we find that the microstructural noise component creates negative
autocorrelation in price increments. We then show algebraically that the negative
autocorrelation creates a bias in the lead-lag tests in favor of finding that information
flow from the market without microstructural noise to the market with microstructural
noise. This is the case even though the two time series are simulated with no cross-
correlation.
Next, we test for autocorrelation in the data and find no signs of consistent non-zero
autocorrelation in CDS spread increments, but a strong tendency towards negative
autocorrelation in corporate bond spread increments derived from both end-of-day
transaction prices and daily bid quotes. This raises the question whether earlier papers,
that test the lead-lag relationship between CDS and corporate bonds, using Granger
causality, Hasbrouck or Gonzalo Granger, are prone to this bias. The vast literature
on this subject agrees that the majority of price discovery takes place in the CDS
market. We test the lead-lag relationship between CDS and corporate bonds using
both the Granger causality test and a test that is not prone to this bias and find that
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price discovery increases significantly in the corporate bond market when we use the
unbiased test.
The first part of the analysis is done using corporate bond quotes. Utilizing in-
formation from public end-of-day transactions of corporate bonds, we find that price
discovery in the corporate bond market increases. Furthermore, we point out the im-
portance of taking into account what time during the day the transaction took place,
by showing that price discovery in the corporate bond market increases further if we
only consider transactions that are executed late in the afternoon. Finally, to reject the
notion that the last result is driven by a subsample selection, we look at the interaction
between relative liquidity in the CDS and bond market and the relative contribution
to price discovery. We find that high CDS liquidity improves the relative contribution
to price discovery from the CDS market, but no clear evidence of such a link in the
corporate bond market.
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6 Figures and Tables
Figure 3.1: CDS-bond-basis. For each firm and each month we subtract the firm’s
corporate bond spread from (on the last day of the month where the bond had a
transaction) a maturity matched CDS spread. If a reference entity has more than one
bond trading in a month we choose the most recently issued bond. Each month we
compute the cross-sectional median basis in red, and the 25% and 75% quantiles in
blue.
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Figure 3.2: Average transaction costs of government-guaranteed corporate
bonds and corporate bonds with no guarantee. For each day and bond we
calculate roundtrip costs (as a percentage of the price) as the median daily roundtrip
cost observed over the past 14 days. The figure shows for government-guaranteed
corporate bonds the average monthly roundtrip costs. Government-guaranteed bonds
consist of 169 bonds issued by 31 financial institutions as part of the TLGP program.
The guaranteed bonds matured between April 2009 and December 2012. The figure
also shows the average monthly roundtrip costs for 1571 bonds not part of the TLGP
program issued by the same 31 financial institutions and with maturities within the
same period as the guaranteed bonds.
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Figure 3.3: Yields on government-guaranteed corporate bonds, swap rates,
and U.S. Treasury bond yields. For each fixed coupon government guaranteed
bond we calculate on each day where there is at least one transaction as the median
yield across all transactions on that day. For each day and guaranteed bond in our
sample we construct a swap rate and Treasury yield with the same maturity. The figure
shows monthly averages of government guaranteed yields, swap rates, and Treasury
yields. We exclude bonds when they have less than one year to maturity.
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Figure 3.4: Histograms of time series autocorrelation in CDS spreads and
corporate bond spread. For each firm-year in the sample we compute the auto-
correlation of changes in the daily 5 year maturity CDS spread and changes in the
daily corporate bond yield quotes. Furthermore, we also compute the autocorrelation
of changes in end of day transactions for the 2729 firm years where the firms most
recently issues corporate bond traded three consecutive days at least 20 times during
the calendar year. We then plot histograms of the computed autocorrelations from
each dataset.
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Table 3.1: Simulation studies showing the effect of negative autocorrelation
in bond yield increments on Granger causality results. We first simulate a
random walk, mt ∼ N(mt−1, σ2), representing the underlying risk. We then define
CDS and bond as
CDSt = mt
bondt = mt + st
and test for Grange causality between CDS and bond. In Panel A st reflects that
bond transactions are executed at the bid or the ask price at random. Such that st
equals k with probability 1/2 and st equals −k with probability 1/2 where 2k is the
bid-ask spread. In panel B st reflects that bond prices are quoted at the bid price with
a time-varying bid-ask spread. The bid-ask spread is simulated as an AR(1) process
with persistence parameter ρ. st is then equal to half the simulated bid-ask spread.
We repeat each simulation 10,000 times for different parameter choices. The table
reports the median autocorrelation in the simulated CDS and bond increments, the
percentage of simulations where CDS and bond is Granger causing, and the median
sum of β parameter estimated in the Granger causality test.
Panel A: Simulation study with bond transaction executed and the bid or the ask price
H0: CDS causes bond H0: bond causes CDS
bid-ask autocorrelation significant sum of significant sum of
σ (bps) spread (bps) ∆CDS ∆bond tests βCDS ’s tests βbond’s
16 22 -0.00 -0.24 100% 2.486 5% -0.002
16 12 -0.00 -0.11 100% 2.472 5% 0.007
16 40 -0.00 -0.38 100% 2.477 5% -0.000
Panel B: Simulation study with bond bid quotes and time-varying bid-ask spread
H0: CDS causes bond H0: bond causes CDS
bid-ask spread autocorrelation significant sum of significant sum of
ρ mean (bps) vol (bps) ∆CDS ∆bond tests βCDS ’s tests βbond’s
0.90 22 22 -0.00 -0.05 20% 0.355 5% -0.000
0.80 22 22 -0.00 -0.06 40% 0.602 5% 0.003
0.70 22 22 -0.00 -0.07 61% 0.835 5% -0.004
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Table 3.2: lead-lag relationship between CDS and corporate bonds. This table
reports results from two tests of the lead-lag relationship between CDS and corporate
bonds. The first test – the unbiased test – consist of estimating the following regressions
for each firm in the sample:
∆CDSt = α
CDS +
5∑
j=1
βbond,j∆bondt−j + εCDSt
∆bondt = α
bond +
5∑
j=1
βCDS,j∆CDSt−j + εbondt ,
where ∆CDSt is the change in quoted 5 year CDS spreads on day t and ∆bondt
is the change in quoted corporate bond spreads on day t. The test concludes that
bond price leads if βbond,j ’s are jointly significant according to a F-test and that CDS
price leads if βCDS,j ’s are jointly is significant according to a F-test. On the same
sample of firms we also test for Granger causality between the CDS and corporate
bond spreads. We split the sample in calendar years, N is the number of firms where
we test the lead-lag relationship, and days is the average number of days in our time
series. Furthermore, the table reports, for each test, the percentage of firms where CDS
leads, the percentage of firms where bond leads and the difference. Significance of the
difference is computed assuming that the lead-lag test results are Bernoulli distributed,
*** indicates 1% significance, ** is 5%, and * is 10%.
Unbiased test Granger causality test
percentage of firms where: percentage of firms where:
year N days CDS leads bond leads difference CDS leads bond leads difference
2002 242 211 23% 23% 0% 26% 24% 2%
2003 350 213 13% 15% −2% 20% 16% 4%
2004 416 218 17% 25% −8%∗∗∗ 24% 22% 2%
2005 509 219 27% 33% −6%∗∗ 38% 26% 12%∗∗∗
2006 512 227 19% 16% 3% 28% 14% 14%∗∗∗
2007 550 218 29% 23% 7%∗∗∗ 34% 18% 15%∗∗∗
2008 580 230 50% 40% 10%∗∗∗ 52% 36% 17%∗∗∗
2009 549 227 32% 29% 4% 34% 27% 7%∗∗∗
2010 590 232 31% 19% 12%∗∗∗ 40% 15% 25%∗∗∗
2011 562 230 35% 21% 14%∗∗∗ 46% 17% 29%∗∗∗
2012 531 195 19% 15% 4%∗ 22% 10% 11%∗∗∗
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Table 3.3: Lead-lag relationship between CDS and corporate bonds in sub-
samples. We estimate the following regressions and concluding that corporate bond is
price leading if βbond,js are jointly significant and that CDS is price leading if βCDS,js
are jointly significant:
∆CDSt = α
CDS +
5∑
j=1
βbond,j∆bondt−j + εCDSt
∆bondt = α
bond +
5∑
j=1
βCDS,j∆CDSt−j + εbondt .
Panel A shows results of the sample split in financials and non-financials. Panel B
shows results of the sample split in investment grade rated firms and speculative grade
rated firms. The table reports, for each subsample, the number of firm-years in the
sample (N), the percentage of firms where CDS leads, the percentage of firms where
bond leads, and the difference between the percentage CDS leads and the percentage
bond leads. Significance of the difference is computed assuming that the lead-lag test
results are Bernoulli distributed, *** indicates 1% significance, ** is 5%, and * is 10%.
Panel A: Sample split into financials and non-financials
financials non-financials
percentage of firms where: percentage of firms where:
N CDS leads bond leads difference N CDS leads bond leads difference
2002-2006 328 16% 17% −1% 1781 20% 24% −4%∗∗∗
2007-2009 271 41% 29% 12%∗∗∗ 1442 36% 30% 6%∗∗∗
2010-2012 292 33% 16% 17%∗∗∗ 1439 27% 19% 8%∗∗∗
Panel B: Sample split into Investment grade and speculative grade
investment grade speculative grade
percentage of firms where: percentage of firms where:
N CDS leads bond leads difference N CDS leads bond leads difference
2002-2006 973 17% 23% −6%∗∗∗ 1095 21% 22% −1%
2007-2009 831 38% 34% 4%∗ 854 36% 27% 9%∗∗∗
2010-2012 749 25% 20% 5%∗∗ 965 31% 17% 14%∗∗∗
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Table 3.4: Improving price discovery with transaction data. We test the lead-
lag relationship between corporate bond and CDS spreads using two different sources
of corporate bond prices. In the first test we use end-of-day transaction prices to
compute changes in corporate bond spread on days where the bond has traded two
consecutive days. On days where the bond has not traded we use quotes. We test the
lead-lag relationship by estimating the following regressions with p = 5
∆CDSt = α
CDS +
p∑
j=1
βbond,j∆bondt−j + εCDSt
∆bondt = α
bond +
p∑
j=1
βCDS,j∆CDSt−j + εbondt .
Column 2 to 6 of Panel A reports the number of firms where we test lead-lag-
relationship, the percentage of firms where CDS price lead, the percentage of firms
where bond price leads, and the difference between the two. Next we use a corpo-
rate bond sample consisting solely of end-of-day transactions. That is, days where
we cannot compute the current or lagged change in bond spreads from transaction
data are excluded from the sample. Furthermore, firm-years with less than 20 days
where current and lagged changes can be computed are excluded. In this test we only
include one lag on the right-hand side in the above regression (p = 1). Column 7 to
11 of Panel A reports lead-lag results of the second test. Panel B shows results of the
lead-lag test on the transaction sample with all years collapsed. We recursively run
test on a smaller set of end-of-day transactions based on what time the transaction
is executed. Significance of differences are computed assuming that the lead-lag test
results are Bernoulli distributed, *** indicates 1% significance, ** is 5%, and * is 10%.
Panel A: Split by year
corporate bond quotes
augmented with transactions corporate bond transactions
percentage of firms where: percentage of firms where:
year N days CDS leads bond leads difference N days CDS leads bond leads difference
2002 242 211 21% 20% 1% 43 77 14% 21% −7%
2003 350 213 10% 13% −3% 98 113 9% 8% 1%
2004 416 218 13% 22% −9%∗∗∗ 81 106 7% 15% −8%
2005 509 219 22% 27% −5%∗ 71 106 11% 28% −17%∗∗∗
2006 512 227 17% 14% 3% 72 90 11% 11% 0%
2007 550 218 25% 23% 2% 63 93 14% 29% −15%∗∗
2008 580 230 46% 39% 7%∗∗ 83 118 33% 41% −8%
2009 549 227 30% 28% 2% 132 112 13% 19% −6%
2010 590 232 24% 14% 10%∗∗∗ 141 105 25% 15% 10%∗∗
2011 562 230 28% 19% 9%∗∗∗ 120 110 18% 18% 0%
2012 531 195 14% 14% 0% 117 100 12% 11% 1%
Panel B: Subsamples of transactions based on execution time
corporate bond transactions
percentage of firms where:
N days CDS leads bond leads difference
all transactions 1021 105 16% 19% −3%∗
transactions executed after 1 pm 493 94 18% 23% −5%∗
transactions executed after 3 pm 205 79 18% 27% −9%∗∗
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Table 3.5: Relative price discovery in the CDS and corporate bond market
sorted by CDS and corporate bond liquidity. We test the lead-lag relationship
between CDS and corporate bond spreads by estimating the following regressions:
∆CDSt = α
CDS +
5∑
j=1
βbond,j∆bondt−j + εCDSt
∆bondt = α
bond +
5∑
j=1
βCDS,j∆CDSt−j + εbondt ,
where ∆CDSt is the change in quoted 5 year CDS spreads on date t and ∆bondt
is the change in end-of-day transaction prices on dates where the bond traded two
consecutive days, on other dates ∆bondt is the change in quotes obtained from Merrill
Lynch. Each year we double sort firms into three buckets based on CDS liquidity,
measured as the average number of dealers quoting the CDS, and thereafter into three
buckets based on bond liquidity, measured as the yearly average RTC (in Panel A)
or as the number of trading days within the year (in Panel B) – 9 buckets in total
per year. We then collapse buckets across years. The main part of the table reports
the percentage of firm-years where the CDS is price leading minus the percentage of
firm-years where the bond is price leading in each bucket. The last column and the
last row is the difference between the most and least liquid buckets. *** indicates 1%
significance, ** is 5%, and * is 10%.
Panel A: Bonds sorted by RTC
Corporate bond liquidity
CDS liquidity low mid high high − low
low 0% −3% 0% 0%
mid 2% 0% 5% 3%
high 8% 3% 2% −6%
high − low 8%∗∗∗ 6%∗∗∗ 2%
Panel B: Bonds sorted by number of trading days
Corporate bond liquidity
CDS liquidity low mid high high − low
low 1% 0% −3% −4%
mid 3% 2% 1% −2%
high 5% 5% 4% −1%
high − low 4% 5%∗ 7%∗∗
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7 Appendix: Simulation Study with Alternative Price Discovery Mea-
sures
In Section 2.2 we simulate different market setting that creates artificial negative au-
tocorrelation in corporate bond spread increment and tested for Granger causality. In
this appendix test the lead-lag relationship between CDS and bond via two alternative
methods, Hasbrouck’s measure Hasbrouck (1995) and Gonzalo and Granger’s measure
Gonzalo and Granger (1995).
To compute the price discovery measures we must first estimates from the following
VECM:
∆CDSt = λ1(CDSt−1 − bondt−1) + γ1∆CDSt−1 + ρ1∆bondt−1 + ε1,t (3.14)
∆bondt = λ2(CDSt−1 − bondt−1) + γ2∆CDSt−1 + ρ2∆bondt−1 + ε2,t (3.15)
A negative and significant λ1 indicates that bond contributes to the price discovery
process and if λ2 is significant and positive CDS contributes to the price discovery
process. The relative contribution of the CDS market and the bond market is measured
by Hasbrouck’s lower and upper bound and by the Gonzalo Granger’s measure. Figures
above 50% indicates that CDS contributes most to price discovery and figures below
50% indicates that bond contributes most to price discovery.
HAS1 =
λ22
(
σ21 − σ
2
12
σ22
)
λ22σ
2
1 − 2λ1λ2σ12 + λ21σ22
, HAS2 =
(
λ2σ1 − λ1 σ12σ1
)2
λ22σ
2
1 − 2λ1λ2σ12 + λ21σ22
, (3.16)
GG =
λ2
λ2 − λ1 . (3.17)
Following Blanco, Brennan, and Marsh (2005) we focus on the mid point of HAS1 and
HAS2.
We run the same two simulation studies as in Section 2.2. First bond resembles
transaction prices executed at the bid and the ask at random, next, bond resembles
bid quotes in a setting with time-varying bid-ask spreads. In each simulation study we
simulate 10,000 paths for different parameter choices and compute the price discovery
measures.
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Results of the first simulation study are in Panel A of Table 3.6 and results of the
second simulation study are in Panel B of Table 3.6. The median λ2 is equal to 1 for
all bid-ask spread in the first simulation experiment. The percentage of λ2’s that are
significant increases with the bid-ask spread indicating that CDS contributes to price
discovery in 70% to 100% of the simulations. on the contrary bond only contributes
to price discovery i 5% of the simulations (the expected false positive rate). This is
picked up by the Gonzalo Granger measure that, in the median observation, asses
that 100% of price discovery happens in the CDS market. The Hasbrouck measure is
more conservative and asses that 56% to 80% of price discovery happen in the CDS
market. Similar results are found in the second simulation study. The percentage of
λ2’s that are significant is lower, but Hasbrouck and Gonzalo Granger still estimate
that respectively 70% and 100% of price discovery happens in the CDS market.
These simulation experiment highlights that the most common methods for measur-
ing price discovery produce biased results when the autocorrelation of one time series
is negative. Especially Gonzalo and Granger’s measure produce misleading results,
but computing Hasbrouck’s measure also lead to biased results.
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Table 3.6: Simulation studies showing the effect of negative autocorrela-
tion in bond yield increments on Hasbrouck’s and Gonzalo and Granger’s
measures. We first simulate a random walk, mt ∼ N(mt−1, σ2), representing the
underlying risk. We then define CDS and bond as
CDSt = mt
bondt = mt + st
We estimate a VECM of CDS and bond and compute Hasbrouck and Gonzalo Granger
price discovery measures. In Panel A st reflects that bond transactions are executed
at the bid or the ask price at random. Such that st equals k with probability 1/2 and
st equals −k with probability 1/2 where 2k is the bid-ask spread. In panel B st reflects
that bond prices are quoted at the bid price with a time-varying bid-ask spread. The
bid-ask spread is simulated as an AR(1) process with persistence parameter ρ. st is then
equal to half the simulated bid-ask spread. We repeat each simulation 10,000 times
for different parameter choices. The table reports the estimated parameters λ1 and λ2
and the percentage of simulations where the parameters are significantly different from
0, and finally the median values of estimated Hasboruck and Gonzalo and Granger
measures. median autocorrelation in the simulated CDS and bond increments, the
percentage of simulations where CDS and bond is Granger causing, and the median β
parameter estimated in the Granger causality test.
Panel A: Simulation study with bond transaction executed and the bid or the ask price
autocorrelation Hasbrouck
σ (bps) BA (bps) ∆CDS ∆bond λ1 % sign. λ2 % sign. lower upper mid GG
16 12 -0.00 -0.11 -0.00 5% 1.00 77% 0.12 0.99 0.56 1.00
16 22 -0.00 -0.24 0.00 5% 1.00 100% 0.32 0.99 0.66 1.00
16 40 -0.00 -0.38 -0.00 5% 1.00 100% 0.61 0.99 0.80 1.00
Panel B: Simulation study with bond bid quotes and time-varying bid-ask spread
bid-ask spread autocorrelation Hasbrouck
ρ mean (bps) vol (bps) ∆CDS ∆bond λ1 % sign. λ2 % sign. lower upper mid GG
0.90 22 22 0 -0.05 0 5 0.08 85 0.56 0.97 0.78 1
0.80 22 22 0 -0.06 0 5 0.13 90 0.43 0.98 0.71 1
0.70 22 22 0 -0.07 0 5 0.16 91 0.36 0.99 0.68 1
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